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ABSTRACT 
In September 2014, a team of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Officer Students 
from Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA, under the 
direction of Defense Analysis Department faculty, set out to answer this question: “How 
might we design a Special Operations Force (SOF) to best serve Norway’s security 
interests in 2025?”   
The team explored the future of Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 
through the lens of Design Thinking.  As a starting point of Design process, the team 
began the Discovery Phase with an environmental analysis and in-depth discussions with 
more than 25 international subject matter experts.  This Technical Report describes the 
team’s findings and prototypes as well as its nine month Design Thinking process.  The 
prototypes were presented in May 2015 to the sponsor, the Norwegian Special Operations 
Command, as input to its long-term development plan.  
In brief, the team expects future warfare to move beyond the military domain into 
the civil domain, challenging traditional organizations and doctrines.  To meet future 
challenges, the team recommends that NORSOF be: transformed to be a truly strategic 
instrument; configured to be a flexible, adaptable, highly maneuverable, well-connected 
network with a flat organization structure; re-organized to support interservice, 
interdepartmental and international cooperation; redesigned to integrate R&D and 
organizational innovation; reoriented to emphasize Military Assistance and 
Unconventional Warfare; and renewed to take a life-long perspective on career 
development with multiple career tracks activated to recruit, select, train, educate and 
retain the right personnel. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In September 2014, a team of Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Officer Students 
from Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA, under the 
direction of Defense Analysis Department faculty, set out to answer this question: “How 
might we design a Special Operations Force (SOF) to best serve Norway’s security 
interests in 2025?”   
Sponsored by the Commander of Norwegian Special Operations Command 
(NORSOCOM), the team examined the future of Norwegian Special Operations Forces 
(NORSOF) through the lens of Design Thinking methodology.  Environmental analysis 
and in-depth discussions with more than 25 international subject-matter experts was the 
starting point for a creative process that produced innovative prototypes for a future 
NORSOF. The prototypes were presented in May 2015 to NORSOCOM as input to the 
new, long-term development plan for the Norwegian Armed Forces.  This Technical 
Report describes the group’s findings and prototypes as well as its nine month process.  
A. BACKGROUND 
In the aftermath of 9/11, Norwegian Special Operations Forces started a journey 
of radical build-up similar to many other nations’ SOF.  After doubling its size in less 
than 10 years, NORSOF is no longer a marginal activity within the Norwegian Armed 
Forces.  Its earlier strategy of expansion and procurements “under the radar” shifted in 
2014 with the establishment of a joint NORSOCOM, an organization with more visible 
official requirements, guidelines and budgets. Anticipating this shift, NORSOF teamed 
up with the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) in 2012 to strengthen its 
capacity for strategic research, analysis, and development. FFI subsequently established 
the “Future SOF” research program to combine and integrate the efforts of FFI scientists 
and NORSOF officers. 
Since the seventies FFI has provided strategic analyses to Norwegian Defense and 
has refined its method of scenario-based analysis for long-term defense planning. A key 
element is the use of scenarios to describe future missions and tasks (Glaerum & 
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Hennum, 2010). The required capabilities to execute these missions and tasks are derived 
through wargaming with subject matter experts (SME’s) where alternative courses of 
action (CoA’s) are discussed and analyzed (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. FFI’s Scenario Based Analysis. 
The required capability and capacity (demand) is then compared to the current 
organization’s capability and capacity (supply) in a gap analysis. The gap may be bridged 
through either additional funding or adjustments to the organization. If neither of these 
options is viable, ambitions with respect to missions and tasks need to be reduced in order 
to balance the system. 
In accordance with this methodology, FFI developed 14 scenarios for NORSOF, 
each broken down into a wide range of missions and tasks. Each scenario was wargamed 
and analyzed in terms of its required capabilities and capacities with assistance from 
SMEs.  This analytical, linear approach to planning ensured traceability and offered 
clearly identifiable results.  However, something important was missing. The analysis 
captured the current threats, missions, tasks, CoA’s and capability requirements well, but 
it was limited in its ability to identify new ideas and game changers to anticipate the 
future threat environment.  
A large number of great companies have failed due to their inability to move 
beyond current successes (Christensen 2000). Left to themselves, they repeat what has 
made them successful in the past rather than develop new strategies for the future. 
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Determined not to repeat this mistake, FFI initiated several activities to ensure that good 
ideas “out there”–technological, doctrinal or organizational–were captured.  
One of the places “out there” was the Naval Postgraduate School’s Defense 
Analysis Department (NPS DA), widely recognized as the world’s premier institution for 
Special Operations graduate thinking and education. Situated half-way across the globe 
from Norway, NPS offered independent advice with the benefit of distance. FFI proposed 
the idea of sending a Visiting Research Scientist from FFI and NPS DA immediately 
supported and accepted it. By August 2014, FFI established a permanent Norwegian 
Faculty presence and shortly thereafter, the NORSOF 2025 Study was born.      
B. THE NORSOF 2025 STUDY 
 Professor Nancy Roberts from NPS DA and Visiting Research Scientist Espen 
Berg-Knutsen from FFI launched NORSOF 2025 in September 2014. They organized 
and supervised ten NPS DA student officers from Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Sweden and the USA into a three-quarter study team. As military 
professionals, the students brought to the table a unique and broad background of 
extensive field experience and knowledge of SOF military affairs. The ten-person team 
met 2-4 hours weekly for discussions in addition to working on individual assignments 
and sub-group activities. In total, the study accounted for approximately 25 % of the 
students’ total workload at NPS during these three quarters. 
The intent of NORSOF 2025 was to parallel FFI’s strategic planning study for 
NORSOCOM. But instead of employing FFI’s more traditional approach to planning 
using scenario-based analysis, the NPS DA team selected an alternative approach 
comprised of the following key elements: 
• Design Thinking as its methodology to generate creative ideas and 
prototypes 
• Longer-term focus (2025) 
• Greater latitude, fewer constraints in problem solving 
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Its purpose was to challenge traditional thinking, generate new ideas, and 
formulate a set of innovative recommendations for NORSOF’s consideration. In order to 
achieve these goals, the NORSOF 2025 project directors deliberately limited the 
cooperation and spill-over between the two studies, although the NORSOF 2025 team did 
conduct extensive discussions with both Norwegian and International SMEs as well as 
NPS faculty and students. 
NORSOF is currently a highly regarded elite special operations force. Some may 
question the wisdom of changing such a well-functioning system.  But as we visualize the 
challenges facing SOF, time and warfare adaptations are important factors in our analysis 
(see Figure 2). For example, if we view military operations as three different types – 
special, conventional and outmoded, then what may be deemed “special” at one point in 
time, can become conventional at another point in time.  Ultimately, some operations can 
become outmoded as exemplified in World War I trench warfare (Gudmundsson 1989). 
Our point is that Special Operations Forces do not have the franchise for special 
operations. If unable to fulfill its role as the cutting-edge innovator of the military forces 
charged with developing new operations, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, 
SOF risks stagnation and challenges from general purpose forces that also are adapting to 
the environmental exigencies. To retain its edge, SOF constantly must explore the future 



























Figure 2. The Challenge. 
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Hence, some fundamental and important questions launched this study:  What is 
the future of Special Operations? What can SOF expect in 2025? And how should SOF 
be designed to tackle these potential challenges? The question with which we opened this 
chapter best captures the design challenge the students were tasked to address: “How 
might we design a Special Operations force to best serve Norway’s security interests in 
2025?” 
C. SPONSOR GUIDELINES AND DESIGN CHALLENGE 
Good sponsorship is a key success factor in establishing a design challenge. We 
were fortunate and grateful to have the Commander of NORSOCOM, Rear Admiral Nils 
J. Holte, the very top of the organization, to be personally involved in our process. 
NORSOCOM presented four guidelines for the study: 
Design the optimal future NORSOF 





3. Homeland Security (military support) 
Keep within realistic budgets 
Be innovative RADM Nils J. Holte
Commander NORSOCOM
 
Figure 3. Sponsor Guidelines. 
The first guideline was to design the optimal future NORSOF irrespective of 
historical structures and restrictions. We were at liberty to start from scratch and create a 
completely new NORSOF. The second guideline gave three future mission priorities. In 
order of importance, these are:  homeland defense, alliance commitments, and military 
support to homeland security. These priorities were maybe less of a surprise, since 
Norway is a small country bordering Russia, but nevertheless very important inputs to 
our process. The third guideline was to keep within reasonable budgets. We chose to 
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interpret this as an option to consider a modest increase of NORSOF’s structure by 2025. 
Be innovative was the Commander’s final guideline. This point was identical to FFI’s 
main purpose for setting up the NORSOF 2025 study. 
The guidelines offered greater latitude and fewer constraints than in FFI’s 
scenario-based analysis conducted in Norway and provided the ideal starting point for a 
creative process that we hoped would open up innovative solutions for NORSOF’s 
future. 
D. METHOD AND PROCESS 
This section describes the methods used in the study and the process we employed 
to generate our recommendations.   
1. Design Thinking 
Design Thinking is a process that generates new ideas for the purpose of 
developing innovative products, processes, services, and even strategic designs. 
Developed at Stanford’s Hasso Platner Institute of Design (d.school), founded in 2005 by 
David Kelley, a Stanford professor of Mechanical Engineering, Design Thinking is the 
method that informs this study. We find it appropriate for our work because it combines 
creative and analytical approaches, requires cross-disciplinary collaboration, draws on 
“methods of engineering and design, and [integrates] them with ideas from the arts, tools 
from the social sciences, and insights from the business world” (Stanford Graduate 
School of Business 2015).   
Design Thinking begins with a design challenge—usually in the form of a 
problem, issue, or question facing a company or an organization. Initial discussions with 
our sponsor enabled us to frame our design challenge as a question: How might we 
design a special operations force to best serve Norway’s security interests in 2025? 
To address this question, our design team of ten students launched the five-phase 
Design Thinking model (shown in Figure 4): Discovery, Define, Ideate, Prototype, and 
Test.    
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Figure 4. Design Thinking Process. 
The Discovery Phase initiates the exploration of the design challenge and its 
context. The designer’s goal is to observe, listen, and learn from the people who live with 
the challenge in order to understand their perspectives and fundamental needs. There are 
many ways to gather information on people’s needs, including examining archival 
records, observing people in their work, and conducting face-to-face discussions with 
people about their work environment. 
The Problem Definition Phase reframes the design challenge. Often design 
challenges are not well articulated and represent only the presenting problem and not the 
underlying problem or issue facing the organization. The design team then may need to 
reformulate the problem statement after gathering information from the Discovery Phase.  
The Ideation Phase generates ideas to address the reframed problem. Using “how 
might we” (HMW) questions, designers launch a brainstorming session where they 
encourage a spectrum of ideas, defer judgment, and build on the ideas offered (Brown 
2009). When generating new ideas, the goal is to widen the possible solution space for 
the given problem, which is why designers are encouraged to build on others’ ideas 
before selecting their preferred solution. 
After generating ideas, designers must choose which ideas to carry forward into 
prototyping. First they establish criteria on which to base their selection, and then select 
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one or more ideas during the Prototyping Phase. Prototyping transforms ideas into 
physical representations and prototypes come in many different tangible forms: sketches, 
models or physical objects, role-plays, skits, and videos. The goal of prototyping is to 
start with a rough representation of an idea (e.g. napkin drawing) to prompt a design team 
conversation. Rough representations or low-resolution prototypes are preferred because 
they are small investments in time and resource.  Designers then only move to higher and 
higher resolution prototypes upon discovering what aspects of their prototypes are viable, 
learning from their mistakes as they work. “Fail early to succeed sooner” is the designer’s 
motto (Brown 2009).   
Testing is an iterative conversation between designers and those for whom they 
are designing. The goal is to solicit feedback on the prototype as a solution to the design 
problem. Testing may result in different outcomes: go forward with the prototype and 
continue making higher resolutions; go forward but with minor modifications; go back to 
the drawing board and select other ideas to prototype; or possibly, return to the problem, 
redefine it, and repeat the design thinking process. Ideally, through this iterative process, 
a tailored-made solution emerges in response to the sponsor’s design challenge.   
2. Strategic Design/Redesign of Organizations 
The application of Design Thinking to the strategic design/redesign of large 
complex business organizations is relatively rare (e.g. Martin 2009), and even more rare 
in military organizations. However, recent explorations at the Naval Postgraduate School 
in the Defense Analysis Department led by Dr. Nancy Roberts (Army 2020; Civil Affairs 
2025), suggest some modifications when applying Design Thinking at the strategic level. 
One way to help designers navigate through the complicated terrain of strategic design is 
to employ a generic organizational systems framework such as the one illustrated in 

















Figure 5.  Organizational Systems Framework (Nancy Roberts). 
The basic elements of the Organizational Systems Framework include: 
• Environmental scanning—an exploration of the organization’s political, 
economic, social and technological landscape expected in 2025, including its 
major stakeholders and potential adversaries.  
• Direction setting—the course the organization wants to pursue in 2025, which 
includes its statements of purpose, identity, and values.   
• Design Factors—those organizational elements that need to be modified to fit 
the organization’s direction: tasks; people and their skills; type of warfare they 
employ; organizational structure; and organizational processes or subsystems 
(e.g. human resource management, decision making, information 
management, financing and budgeting etc.). 
3. Design Thinking combined with Systems Framework 
As illustrated in Figure 6, designers first explore the environmental forces and 
trends as part of the Design Thinking Discovery Phase.  Organizational direction setting 
becomes their problem definition—given this environment, how are we going to be 












• Guiding                       
Principles 
 How Might We  








Figure 6. Design Process combined with Organizational Systems Model. 
The organizational design factors then become the focal point for ideation, 
prototyping, and testing:   
• What tasks does the organization need to accomplish its direction?   
• What people and what kinds of skills are required for these tasks? 
• What type of organizational structure is needed?  
• What organizational subsystem/processes (e.g. human resource 
management) does the organization need to ensure its functioning?  
• And in the case of military organization, what kind of warfare should the 
organization pursue (including doctrine and technology employed) to fight 
its battles and accomplish its missions?   
4. Unique Features of NORSOF 2025 Study Process  
The application of Design Thinking to the strategic redesign of any organization 
is a complicated process. There is never enough time to read all the documents and talk to 
all the people who ideally would inform such a study. In this case, the design team 
decided that it was important that all members participate in the Discovery Phase in order 
to build a common understanding of the international, national and SOF environment.    
In addition, the team agreed that all members should participate in discussions with key 
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stakeholders to probe their insights about the future and what paths NORSOF might 
pursue. To engage the largest number of stakeholders, team members formed two-person 
groups and each contacted personnel from a list of people the entire team generated for a 
total of 25+ discussions.    
After completing the Discovery Phase, the team was ready for the Problem 
Definition Phase. Again the whole team was engaged in crafting the NORSOF 2025 
strategic direction and the formulation of its identity statement. However, it used 
subgroups to flesh out the details for each of the four questions: Who are we? What do 
we do? How do we do it? And why do we do it? The subgroups then met to combine 
their answers to these questions and craft an integrated identity statement. 
Once the Discovery and the Problem Definition Phases were addressed, the team 
then turned to the Organizational Systems Framework to identify design elements around 
which the design team would ideate, prototype, and test. Depending on individual team 
members’ interest and expertise, subgroups formed around: 
• NORSOF Tasks that would be required. 
• NORSOF People and their Skills that would be required 
• NORSOF Organizational Structure that would be needed to support missions 
• NORSOF Organizational Sub-systems/Processes, particularly Human 
Resource Management which the team felt was a particularly important 
organizational process given its analysis in the first two phases 
• Innovative Warfare—how people would conduct missions with what new 
technology and doctrine.    
Periodically throughout the prototyping process, the whole design team would 
reconvene to update one another on the prototypes and whether the new ideas they were 
developing in their sub-groups were mutually compatible.  It wasn’t just a matter of 
generating innovative ideas and building prototypes for each design element; it was a 
matter of finding creative ideas that fit together with the other design elements.  The “fit” 
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among the design elements as a whole was a requirement of the organizational systems 
framework and one that the design team took very seriously.  
The design team tested the sponsor’s reaction to the work in progress at four 
meetings. Sponsor guidelines and the study plan were discussed and decided in October 
2014. Preliminary findings in the Discovery and Define Phases were presented in January 
2015, while a more thorough status of Design Factors was briefed in Norway by two 
students in March. Finally, the team organized an international seminar at NPS in May 
2015 for feedback from the sponsor and other senior NATO SOF representatives. 
E. REPORT STRUCTURE AND LIMITATIONS 
The chapters of this report follow the structure of the Organizational Systems 
Framework described above. Chapter II discusses the Environmental Trends. Chapter III 
sets the direction for NORSOF 2025, drawing on the environmental trends and input 
from more than 25 subject matter experts.   
The design factors are described in detail in Chapters IV-VIII. Key themes are 
summarized in Chapter IX, while Chapter X wraps up and discusses lessons learned from 
the study. Appendixes A and B present examples of relevant future operational 
environments for SOF: Hybrid Warfare and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) scenarios.  
Due to practicalities, the study is unclassified. SOF organizations are typically 
highly classified and to conduct an unclassified study of the future NORSOF can be 
challenging.  By necessity, we have left some elements out, which it is fair to say has had 
an impact on the direction and validity of the study. More specifically, we have been 
unable to address: 
• Details of current size, capability and capacity of NORSOF  
• Budgets, accounts and materiel investments  
As a consequence, it has not been possible to conduct cost efficiency calculations. 
This omission limits consideration of the optimal structure and future garrisons for 
NORSOF which are not included in this study. Furthermore, a detailed discussion of the 
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size of structural elements and their sub-units has not been addressed. Budgetary 
implications of the proposed recommendations are only superficially assessed. 
Apart from these elements, the design team has however, maybe surprisingly, met 
few unsurmountable challenges with respect to classification. The result is a study which 
has been able to assess wide-ranging organizational issues, and arguably, address some of 
the most important challenges facing NORSOF going forward. 
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II. THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT 
The NORSOF 2025 strategic design process started with a discussion of global 
trends affecting Norway and subsequent development of a general description of future 
environments NORSOF might encounter.   
A. SOURCES 
The NORSOF 2025 design team examined a number of sources on future trends 
and environments. Most of the written sources are over the horizon assessments from the 
allied intelligence community and other credible academic institutions. The most 
important sources have been: 
• U.S. Office of The Director of National Intelligence (2015) 
• Norwegian Intelligence Service (2015) 
• Norwegian Ministry of Defense / Norwegian Defense Expert Group (2015) 
• U.K Ministry of Defense (2014) 
In addition, we approached 25+ subject matter experts (SME’s) for their personal 
view on future trends and challenges and how SOF might deal with them. These SMEs 
were experienced professionals from various Norwegian governmental offices, 
Norwegian and International senior ranking military officers, and prominent 
representatives from academia and the private sector.  
Rather than develop possible scenarios based on these sources for future 
NORSOF operations, the design team opted for an alternative approach. This first chapter 
captures as concisely as possible, the most important aspects of the future environment as 
a starting point for the design of NORSOF 2025.  
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B. RELATIVE CERTAINTIES1 
The Office of The Director of National Intelligence (2015) deems the 
developments listed in Figure 7 to be “relative certainties” for the future environments: 
• Individual Empowerment 
• Strengthened religious and ethnic identities
• Diffusion of Power
• Rogue nations and terrorist criminal networks
• Changing Demographic Patterns
• Aging vs youth populations.  Increased 
migration. Urbanization.
• Increasing Food-Water-Energy Needs
• High conflict potential
 
Figure 7. Relative Certainties–Global Trends. 
Poverty will be reduced over the next decades, resulting in an expansion of the 
global middle classes with better economy, health care and education. Individual 
empowerment is seen as the most important global trend, as it will both cause and have a 
huge effect on most other trends. It is likely to shift values, strengthen religious, ethnic 
and national identities. It also may provide individuals and small groups with the 
capability to inflict disruptions and harm to large populations through the use of 
advanced weapons and technology. 
Asia, with China and India as the dominant players, will surpass North America 
and Europe in global economic power. There may not be any global hegemon. The power 
of other non-Western, middle-tier states (e.g. Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico, and 
Turkey) will rise. This middle tier as a group will surpass Europe, Japan and Russia. 
Technology will be a great leveler, shifting the balance of power towards multifaceted 
networks. New threats will emerge from rogue states and terrorist criminal networks. 
                                                 
1 This section is a summary of arguments presented by the U.S. Office of The Director of National 
Intelligence in Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (2015). 
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Libya is an example, with a humanitarian crisis that serves as a hothouse for terror. 
Fatally undermined by a possible access to WMD technology, highly networked terrorist 
groups continue to challenge the power of nation-states.  
Rapid extensions of life expectancy are likely. Deaths from communicable 
diseases are projected to drop by more than 40 %. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia will still have youthful populations. Countries with aging populations face the 
possibility of decline in economic growth. Increased migration will spread to emerging 
powers. Urbanization is set to grow by almost 60 %.  
Demand for resources will increase. The global population will grow from 7.1 
billion today to about 8 billion by 2030. Demand for food is set to rise 35 % and energy 
to increase 50 % over the next 15-20 years. Nearly half of the world’s population will 
live in areas with severe water stress. Fragile states are most at risk, but China and India 
are also vulnerable due to a lack of key resources. The main uncertainty will be whether 
there will be more effective management of critical resources, wider technology use, and 
greater governance mechanisms.  
C. CRITICAL GAME-CHANGERS2 
What might be the outcome of the “relative certainties” listed in the previous 
chapter? The Office of The Director of National Intelligence (2015) listed a number of 
“game-changers” it considers critical for the future global development. We have 
summarized the key themes in Figure 8.  
Potential governance deficits are driven by rapid political and social changes. 
Countries moving from autocracy to democracy have a proven record of high instability. 
About 50 states fall into this major risk group. 
 





• Complicated political landscape
• Megacities/ Regional Groupings
• Global/ Regional Networks
• ICT: Mobilization for change vs Surveillance
• Intrastate Conflicts
• Resource scarcity + disproportionate levels 




Figure 8. Critical Game Changers. 
The political landscape will be more complicated. Megacities and regional 
groupings are likely to assume increasing powers. Networks, some of them between 
rogue states and terrorist movements, will be hard to address directly in the political 
landscape. Information and communication technology (ICT) will make possible multiple 
and simultaneous action, near-instantaneous responses, and mass organization across 
geographical boundaries. This will increase the potential for more frequent change in the 
international system. On the other hand, ICT will increase government’s ability to 
monitor their citizens.  
Resource constraints and a young male population will likely increase the risk of 
intrastate conflict. We see potential for this in many countries particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia, and parts of the Middle East. Most intrastate conflicts will remain in 
the form of irregular warfare, but the spread of precision weaponry may change the 
character of some of these conflicts.  
A more fragmented international system, spillover from regional conflicts, and 
resource competition will increase potential for interstate conflict. The Middle East most 
likely will remain the most volatile region, even as it moves toward greater 
democratization. Future wars in Asia and the Middle East possibly could include a 
nuclear element. Many of these conflicts, once begun, would not be easily containable 
and would have global impacts.  
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D. GEO-POLITICS 2025 AND NORWAY 
In a global perspective, the four geopolitical developments listed in Figure 9 are 
particularly relevant for Norway:  
• Asia-Pacific global center of gravity
– Allied involvement in the high North
• Revisionist Russia 
– no credible opposition
• Middle-East/ North Africa 
– expansion of militant Islam
• WMD/Terrorism/Cyber 
– Few “local” problems
 
Figure 9. Geo-politics 2025 and Norway. 
Asia-Pacific emerges as an important economic and political center of gravity, 
also for our biggest ally, the United States. The shift might affect the United States’ 
willingness and ability to maintain a clear and credible commitment in Northern Europe.  
Russia under Putin has a goal to restore Russia as a world power. It is 
aggressively countering Western expansion into its sphere of interest as illustrated by the 
war in Georgia, the annexation of the Crimea and the current “full spectrum/hybrid war” 
in Ukraine. At the same time, western intelligence services describe Putin as a moderate 
alternative in the Russian political elite, which should be of concern to most westerners.  
A Norwegian contribution to collective NATO defense of former Warsaw pact members 
is one of the scenarios with the highest probability. 
Southwest Asia and North Africa will continue to be characterized by poverty, 
deep cultural differences and militant Islamism. These factors pose a threat far beyond 
the region. Even Norway has a small share of foreign fighters illustrating the global 
proliferation of identities: although having met lower and medium levels in Maslow’s 
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hierarchy of needs, they decide to fight their Jihad in a militant way, far from their 
geographical home, or even worse, inside it.  
The last geopolitical development is the continuation of current threats:   
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the weaponization of 
information and cyber warfare. Geographic distance will have less significance. Norway 
has been struck by terror both at home and overseas. The country is attacked in 
Cyberspace every day, particularly by Russia and China. All these factors will continue 
to affect Norwegian security in 2025. 
E. RUSSIA AND NORWEGIAN DEFENSE PLANNING 
Russia will be the dominating factor in Norwegian Defense planning in the 
foreseeable future. This assertion is based on both geographic and structural factors.  
• Russia dominating factor 
• Geographic reality
• Structural factors
• Increased asymmetry in 
the North
• Increased strategic 
maneuverability
• Better trained RU formations
• Classic scenarios
• RU strategic defense (art V)
• Bilateral vs Norway (art …?)
 
Figure 10. Russia and Norwegian Defense Planning. 
Norway borders the Russian Kola peninsula (marked red), which contains 70-80 
% of the Russian strategic nuclear capabilities. The peninsula as such can be described as 
militarized. Russian forces have increased their training level, responsiveness, mobility 
and range during the last few years. Although Norway and Russia recently settled a 40-
year-long dispute about their common border at sea, issues concerning the continental 
shelf are unresolved. One of the highest differences in GDP per capita in the world runs 
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along Norway’s border with Russia. According to the Research Council of Norway 
(2006) the differences in GDP and life expectancy are higher than those between the 
United States and Mexico. The Norwegian archipelago Spitsbergen (marked green) is 
demilitarized and has a Russian minority.  Its strategic geographic position is empirically 
important to dominate the North Atlantic in a large war.  
Structurally, Norway is part of the Western world order and the Western security 
alliance. Russia is not. Russia’s ambition is to challenge the Western-made international 
system, and it views NATO as a threat to its borders. Norway’s strategic response to 
Russia has been Reassurance. Norway maintains well-developed diplomacy and military 
channels to Russia and they remain open. This openness is based on some common 
interests, and the need to avoid misunderstandings. It is Norway’s ambition to continue 
this balancing act between deterrence and reassurance in the future. 
In a conflict between Russia and any other NATO power, Russia may want to 
secure parts of Norwegian territory (land and/or sea) for its defensive purposes. This is 
the classic Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty scenario.  
In the case of a purely bilateral crisis, Norway’s current ambition is to establish a 
threshold designed to trigger Article 5.  On the other hand, Russia will likely use the full 
spectrum of its powers to pressure small-state Norway to comply, but stopping just short 
of triggering NATO’s involvement. In the case of a bilateral conflict over such remote 
Arctic areas, Russia might calculate, as noted deterrence theorist Thomas Schelling 
(2008) describes it, “some territories are just not worth a war, especially a war that can 
get out of hand.” 
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III. DIRECTION SETTING 
This chapter describes direction setting for the NORSOF 2025 strategic design. It 
is important to note that direction setting in our design process varies from traditional 
military direction setting. Rather than specifying details on vision, goals, strategies and 
missions, direction setting in our design approach offers general guidance. In a turbulent 
environment, time spent on specific details that quickly can become outdated is less 
useful than concentrating on those enduring issues that will be constant regardless of the 
context. Thus, our direction setting focuses on NORSOF’s identity and its guiding 
principles that are expected to be sustained over time.  
A. IDENTITY STATEMENT 
Building on the discovery phase, the design team created the identity statement 
displayed in Figure 11.  
Who are we?
What do we do? How do we do it?








 Full spectrum SOF 
operations in all 
environments
 Cause strategic effect 
 Tasks no one else is 
capable of accomplishing
 Provide an unmatched 
ROI
 Able to solve complex 
strategic problems
 Highly-trained and equipped 
 High readiness, flexibility and 
success rate
 With purpose, speed, 
security, and surprise
 By nurturing a culture of 
innovation
 Through inter-service, 
interdepartmental and 
international partnering
 Through a lifelong career 
perspective
 
Figure 11. NORSOF 2025 Identity Statement. 
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At first glance, this identity statement may look like a status quo description of 
any SOF unit in the Global SOF Network (GSN).  The true value of the identity 
statement, however, was going through the analysis and identifying the difference 
between what we think we do now, and what we actually need to do in the 2025 global 
security environment. While SOF units often have pre-conceived notions with respect to 
identity, a critical analysis identifies shortfalls between reality and what is ideal.   
For instance, the following examples identify some key differences and questions 
that were discovered during the direction setting process: 
1. Who are we? There was a great deal of discussion on what the terms “strategic 
thinking” and “warrior diplomat” even mean. While these words are 
commonplace in the military lexicon, there is indeed debate on accurate 
definitions. Moreover, does NORSOF select and develop strategic thinkers and 
warrior diplomats? In a similar fashion, are the “highly-selected, professional 
soldiers” being selected for the proper attributes? 
2. How do we do it? Does NORSOF truly have a culture of innovation that is 
accepting of change? Also, how effective is NORSOF at partnering, both within 
and beyond Norwegian borders?  Finally, does NORSOF have a lifelong career 
perspective?  
3. Why do we do it?  Is NORSOF actually as flexible as it thinks, or needs to be as 
an organization?  Are operators highly trained in the right capabilities? 
4. What do we do? Is NORSOF optimized for operations in all environments, 
particularly maritime and arctic, in support of homeland defense? Does NORSOF 
actually focus on missions no one else is capable of accomplishing?  Is the focus 
on the right mission sets? Does NORSOF leverage other services/departments 
effectively? Can NORSOF provide a better return on investment (ROI) by 
focusing more or less on niche capabilities? 
Bottom line, the identity statement served as an initial eye opener and was 
paramount in identifying areas that required more attention. In reality it created more 
questions than answers, which was actually a huge benefit to the design process. 
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B. GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
The guiding principles for NORSOF 2025 evolved from the discovery phase, 
especially the environmental challenges expected in 2025. While many factors were 
deemed critically important for the future of NORSOF, three principles stood out:  






Figure 12. NORSOF 2025 Guiding Principles. 
1. Flexibility 
During the Discovery phases and all the SME discussions, the most recurring 
comment was a need for NORSOF to be flexible in 2025. The importance of flexibility is 
highlighted by officer and scholar Meir Finkel in his book “On Flexibility” (2011). 
Finkel’s main thesis is that modern militaries must maintain a flexible and adaptable 
doctrine and organizational culture to cope with the inevitable battlefield surprise and the 
constantly changing operational environment. As described in the environmental 
overview, the future is expected to be complex and turbulent with dramatic shifts and 
rapid changes in the social, economic, and political landscape. Thus, Norway’s challenge 
in balancing homeland defense, alliance commitments far away, and homeland security 
issues will require a high level of adaptation. Moreover, designing NORSOF for full-
                                                 
3 It is important to note that flexibility, integration, and innovation already exist to some extent in 
NORSOF.  However, the intent of our design process is to optimize them in creating NORSOF’s strategic 
design for 2025.    
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spectrum operations, with a homeland defense emphasis on arctic and maritime arenas, 
requires adjustments in structure, resource allocations, and capabilities. Vastly different 
scenarios might occur in rapid succession, leaving SOF without time for organizational 
learning and adaption. Thus, flexibility in mindset, culture and organization will be an 
enduring principle for the future.  While planning for the future always involves inherent 
unknowns, the complex threats expected in the near term require an agility to which 
NORSOF needs to aspire. 
2. Integration 
In addition to flexibility, central to the NORSOF organization in 2025 is the 
ability to work with others which we refer to as cross-boundary coordination and 
integration. The aforementioned global diffusion of power and the challenges it presents 
is beyond the ability of one nation to address.  Moreover, few threats and challenges will 
fit within traditional bureaucracies such as the traditional western style state departments. 
Rather, we envision a whole of government and coalitional approach that involves 
multiple agencies, organizations, and nations. As argued by author Anne Holohan (2005):  
“The UN, NATO, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], 
and other political and military bodies and alliances all have to adapt to a truly 
interdependent world where borders are no longer sacrosanct and the tasks are not 
rigidly divided into military, civil, and political.” 
Although effective integration may take place between senior national and 
international personnel, the design team noted that there is a need for increased 
cooperation and interoperability at all levels. This comprehensive, integrated whole of 
government and coalitional approach has significant implications for all the design 
factors, particularly “people” and “structure”. For instance, NORSOF needs an 
organizational structure that can launch a comprehensive, integrated effort and quickly 
task organize and reorganize the appropriate people in whatever department, in whatever 
nation, to respond to the growing number of failed or failing states.  
3. Innovation 
Another very common theme from discussions with subject matter experts is the 
importance of innovation for NORSOF 2025. This is supported by Robert Spulak (2010), 
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who argues rapid technological innovation is crucial to SOF. As interpreted by the design 
team, innovation means more than advancements in technology and equipment. The 
design team defines innovation as the introduction of a new idea and its implementation 
in practice. Thus it includes new technology, new doctrine, and new structures and 
systems to enliven NORSOF’s strategic design. Most importantly, the people—the users 
of the technology and doctrine–must be selected and trained to launch the new ideas and 
NORSOF’s culture must support and protect them through the implementation process. 
To meet future challenges and counter the myriad of potential threats, the design team 
thus views innovation as a guiding principle to surface new ideas and solutions that have 
yet to be invented. Simply put, if we want something we don’t have, we have to do 
something we have not done—launch an all-out organizational effort to innovate our way 
into the future.   
In summary, it is important to reiterate that our direction setting is purposely 
general in nature, a clear departure from conventional military planning. The NORSOF 
identity statement we created is not expected to change in the near-to-midterm. We 
believe it has clear, concise, and sustained relevance to Norwegian defense requirements 
within the ten-year time period that frames this study.  
The following five chapters outline each of the design factors and the key 
recommendations for NORSOF 2025. The direction setting outlined in this chapter 
served as both a starting point and a guide to keep the design team sub-groups aligned 
throughout the process. While each design factor focuses on a specific aspect of 
NORSOF 2025, NORSOF’s identity and guiding principles of flexibility, integration, and 
innovation inform all sub-group activities. In fact, the guiding principles helped us close 
the gaps between what currently exits and what we envisioned for the future. They also 
enabled us to address the questions the identity statement generated. Both the identity 
statement and the guiding principles thus serve as arcs to guide our entire design process.    
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IV. NORSOF TASKS 
This chapter asks what tasks and jobs NORSOF should conduct in 2025. To 
answer this question, we describe SOF’s general role and current tasks, review the trends 
and future challenges, and finally identify the tasks and jobs that we believe will be 
needed in the future.  
We began our research looking into the global and national environment as 
outlined in Chapter II.  After the environmental analysis, we examined what NATO SOF, 
USSOCOM, and NORSOF already have done as a response to today´s environment and 
how they have positioned themselves for the future. We furthermore reviewed our 
discussions with the international subject matter experts (SME’s). From their insights we 
identified their areas of general agreement on which tasks and jobs NORSOF should 
focus.  
Our next step examined the core SOF tasks currently defined by NATO and US 
Armed Forces. We chose the two organizations because of Norway´s strong relationship 
and commitment to them and the importance of NORSOF’s interoperability with them. 
These two organizations have, to some extent, gone in two different directions. While 
NATO has kept its core SOF tasks few and broad, the USSOF community have increased 
its core tasks but made them more specialized.  Our question was then in which direction 
NORSOF should go—broad or specialized?  
A. CURRENT NORSOF TASKS 
One way to understand SOF in the current environment is to describe the range of 
tasks that SOF does in comparison to General Purpose Forces (GPF). An NPS Defense 
Analysis Seminar Report offers an interesting way to examine the “SOF space” as shown 
in Figure 13 (Simons 2012): 
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 Figure 13. SOF Brackets GPF (Simons 2012). 
In a strictly military sense, SOF brackets GPF. GPF are great for force-on-force 
engagements, designed as they are for sustained combat operations. In contrast, SOF has 
units that excel at short duration, high intensity direct-action missions. At the same time 
they have the opposite capability—to work by, with, and through indigenous forces in 
more long-term training and assistance missions (Simons 2012).  
The complex and interconnected future environment also will demand a higher 
cooperation and coordination between SOF and GPF. There likely will be small footprint 
and persistent-presence operations that will consist of both SOF and GPF working 
together in the same environment. 
In a more integrated sense, SOF also fits within the interagency and 
interdepartmental “space” as a bridge to other agencies. The intelligence agencies 
develop their assets in a covert manner, while the State Department and other 
governmental agencies engage in overt diplomacy and development. SOF´s role in 
contrast, is to deal with armed others, whether foreign militaries or anti-state actors, as 
shown in Figure 14 (Simons 2012).  
 
Figure 14. SOF Bridges the Interagency (Simons 2012). 
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Currently NORSOF’s tasks and jobs (see Figure 15) follow traditional SOF tasks 
and are in-line with NATO doctrine. Today´s core tasks are SR, DA, and MA, which 
have provided SOF with the flexibility and adaptability for today´s needs both 
domestically and abroad. 
Core Tasks (NATO Requirement):
• Special Reconnaissance (SR)
• Direct Action (DA)
• Military Assistance (MA)
Additional Tasks (National 
Requirement):
• Hostage Release Operations (HRO)
• Domestic CT
• Support to OGA
• Close Protection
 
Figure 15. Current NORSOF Tasks and Jobs. 
NORSOF current core tasks are in-line with the NATO doctrine and satisfy 
NATO´s requirements for a NATO Special Operations Task Force (SOTF). The three 
broad tasks are also well known within the international SOF community and have 
created the general understanding within military leadership of how SOF should be 
utilized.  
In addition to the three core tasks, NORSOF has a national requirement to 
conduct hostage rescue operations worldwide, and domestic counter-terrorism both 
maritime and land in support of the police. These tasks are viewed as additional tasks for 
NATO SOF units, but not a requirement. On a more irregular basis, NORSOF conducts 
support to other governmental agencies, and when tasked, conducts close protection for 
the Norwegian Chief of Defense.  
In summary, the current tasks show that NORSOF has had a traditional mission 
set, and has prioritized broad preparation rather than specialization. NORSOF’s expertise 
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is closely linked to the unique Norwegian environment: arctic, winter, littoral, and 
mountainous terrain, as well as Norway´s large merchant fleet and GOPLATS4. 
B. TRADE-OFFS / DILEMMAS 
NORSOF, with its relative sparse resources, will always be faced with trade-offs 
and dilemmas when it comes to a discussion of specialization versus broad preparation.  
Figure 16 illustrates one set of dilemmas that NORSOF has to balance as part of 
its preparations for the future. The dilemma is to be constantly ready to conduct the high 
end important strategic tasks of CT/HRO and National Defense, while at the same time, 

















• Building, Plane, 
Bus, Train
Support to OGA
• Support/ Secure Peace talks





Support to International CR
• NATO/ EU/ UN/ USA
• Full spectrum SOF 
(SR,DA,MA)
• Low footprint / long-term
• Lead small joint teams
National Defense 
• C-UW Domestic
• Support Guerrilla ops
• Independent SOF ops
• NATO article 5
 
Figure 16. Trade-offs / Dilemmas for NORSOF 
On the one hand, the tasks on the upper left side of the graph have high strategic 
importance and effect if not accomplished successfully due to the public and political 
attention these types of tasks have both globally and domestically. These tasks are called 
“no failure missions.” However, their occurrence is few and far between. 
                                                 
4 GOPLATS: Gas and Oil Platforms. 
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On the other hand, the tasks on the lower right side of the graph are more 
frequent, but they have lower strategic importance because of their small footprint and 
long-term focus. These tasks are less visible and don't have the same level of publicity.  
Norway, with its relatively small SOF community, has decided not to require 
specialization of its SOF community for either of these mission sets but kept a broad 
preparation focus—NORSOF as the "Jack of all trades.” This stance has enabled 
NORSOF to be a flexible and adaptable tool for decision-makers.  
C. TRENDS IN FUTURE TASKS AND JOBS  
The most significant shift in NORSOF tasks and jobs is shown in Figure 17 
below.   We believe the future points to more MA-type tasks rather than DA type tasks as 
















SJT = Small Joint Teams
S-OGA = Support to Other 
Governmental Agencies  
Figure 17. Future trends (author’s predictions). 
The notion of doing small cost-efficient, proactive actions, as part of an integrated 
interagency approach, avoids conducting large-scale reactive operations and is more 
politically acceptable in an economically and politically constrained environment. As 
Linda Robinson (2013) notes: 
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“Special operations forces have played an increasingly prominent role over the 
past decade in many ways, and that trend is likely to continue in the future for two 
basic reasons: technology and political preference. A highly skilled, small military 
force is more cost effective than a large one and less likely to cause attendant 
political and diplomatic complications—if it is used with care and sophistication.” 
Another task we view as becoming even more important in the future high-tech, 
complex, interconnected environment is research and development (R&D). To survive on 
the battlefield and to be as cost efficient as possible, a SOF organization needs to stay in 
front or at a minimum keep up with innovations in both technology and doctrine.  With 
regards to terrorism, CT and SR tasks will continue to play an important role in the future 
environment. However, we believe the frequency will stay relative constant compared to 
today, although with a slight upward trajectory. 
As a result of Russia´s strategic and political show of force in the last couple of 
years, the need for counter unconventional/hybrid warfare will likely increase in the 
future. A nation’s ability to use all aspects of national power in an integrated manner 
(DIME5) will be a necessity for National Defense and SOF will be a critical element in 
the integration.   
D. FUTURE TASKS 
Based on the environmental analysis, the insights from the SME’s, our current 
assessment of NORSOF’s tasks and jobs, anticipated trends, and Norway´s commitment 
to NATO, we recommend the following tasks and missions for NORSOF (see Figure 18). 
Drawing on Figure 18, we believe that NORSOF should keep SR, DA, and MA as 
its core tasks, broadly defined and in-line with NATO and Norway´s requirements. These 
tasks are well known within the international SOF community. Their broad definitions 
will enable NORSOF to continue to be a flexible and responsive strategic tool in future 
national defense, national and international crisis response scenarios. 
 
                                                 
5 DIME: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economics. 
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Additional future focus areas
• Interagency coordination 
• Lead small joint interagency teams 
(NIS, DoD, MFA, DoJ)
• National interagency network
• International Global SOF network
• Domestic Anti-terrorism in support of 
the Justice Department
• National Counter UW/Hybrid Warfare 
• National guerrilla/resistance operations
• Political and Economic Warfare

















Figure 18.  Recommended future tasks and missions. 
Because of SOF’s culture and flexibility, it is extremely well suited to lead small 
joint teams that have the responsibility of finding integrated and whole-of-government 
solutions to complex challenges. Thus, we see NORSOF as an important bridge in the 
interagency, interdepartmental, and international arena.  We also see the strategic utility 
of NORSOF increasing as the NORSOF community expands across departmental and 
national boundaries. SOF’s reach and capability will increase through national and 
international networking, and its strategic effect will grow as SOF activity moves more 
towards proactive operations both at home and abroad. SOF’s ability to build and 
participate in cross-boundary networks and work in combined/joint teams will be a key 
factor in its future success.  
Anti-terrorism is also an area where the SOF community is under-utilized and 
could bring new domestic solutions and capabilities. However, SOF anti-terrorism 
involvement would require some changes to current Norwegian laws and political 
acceptance for using SOF proactively in peacetime, a subject we did not address in this 
report. 
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We also see involvement in Counter-UW/hybrid warfare as a NORSOF task. We 
consider the ability to operate in an environment between peacetime police scenarios and 
full-blown national defense Article 5 scenarios critical to Norway’s defense. As such, we 
organized a wargame at NPS in May 2015 to better understand what kind of challenges 
Norway and NORSOF might face in a complex hybrid warfare environment. As 
summarized in Appendix A, one of the conclusions is that an integrated approach is a key 
success factor in such a scenario. These game results reinforce our view that NORSOF 
should be able to assist, facilitate and coordinate a Norwegian whole of government 
counter/ hybrid approach. At the same time, we recognize that NORSOF should retain its 
capability to strike a high-tech opponent’s key installations in a high intensity scenario, 
e.g. Anti-Air Missile Defense Systems as demonstrated in Appendix B.  
As the innovative laboratory of the Norwegian Armed Forces, NORSOF should 
continuously consider its future tasks and missions. Consequently, our final point is that 
SOF needs to strengthen its research and development efforts and to link its 
organizational and technological innovations to doctrinal innovations, a subject explored 
in greater depth in the next chapter.  
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V. INNOVATIVE WARFARE 
It is no easy task to anticipate the future of warfare and how it may impact the 
way NORSOF will organize to fight.  How can NORSOF keep the decisive advantage 
over its adversaries? How does it remain the highly flexible and capable force of choice 
as it is today? In a rapidly changing world with mind-blowing technological 
developments, how will NORSOF anticipate and adapt to them by making innovative 
changes to its technology, doctrine, and fighting organization?  
Innovative warfare, as we define it, is an overarching term that applies to people 
generating and implementing new ideas about technology, military doctrine, and the way 
they organize to fight with the ultimate goal of gaining the decisive advantage over a 
future adversary. We allow that being innovative is not a matter of increasing dependency 
on technology. “Technology is not a silver bullet;” it both “empowers and imperils.” 
Rather than making a choice between high tech and low tech, we follow the guidance of 
Dr. John Arquilla and search for the “the right tech.” Depending on the circumstances, 
NORSOF should always be able to fight degraded, or “low tech” opponents as well as 
“high tech” ones.  We also follow the guidance of Robert Spulak (2010) who notes:  
“advanced technology and understanding should no longer be thought of 
only as products that are supplied to SOF and which SOF use. The 
alternative is to integrate science and understanding with tools and 
technology and with missions and users, allowing the early adoption of 
concepts and technologies.”   
Thus, we believe it is important to raise the question of innovative warfare in all of its 
dimensions—innovations in technology, doctrine, and organizing to fight.   
A. TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION   
Historical cases illustrate whoever is first to recognize, understand, and 
implement an innovation, can gain a decisive advantage over an opponent. Past examples 
of technology-driven innovations in military affairs are the invention of the machine gun, 
the submarine, and the aircraft carrier. All of these developments have changed warfare 
completely.  
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Currently, most leading scholars agree that three technological developments of 
our time are central to the revolution in military affairs as shown in Figure 19: 
Information technology and the information dominance on the future battlefield; 
Integration of unmanned systems, robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology; 
and Nonlethal technology (Singer 2009). 
Technology Innovations:
1. Information technology and 
the information dominance 
on the future battlefield; 
2. Integration of unmanned 
systems (air/sea/land), 
robotics and Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), technology; 
3. Nonlethal technology. 
 
Figure 19. Technological Innovations.  
1. Information Technology 
There are many promising information technology innovations that have the 
potential to change the future of warfare. Haptic technology, brain wave sensing, and 
laser-based display eyewear are examples of recent innovations in this field.  
Haptic technology is a feedback technology, using computer applications, that 
takes advantage of the user’s sense of touch by applying force, vibrations and/or motions 
to the user.  The technology is spreading rapidly and is used in smartphones, game 
controllers and joysticks.   
Brain wave sensing enables the control of technology functions by the brain. A 
possible future use of the technology could be to monitor the mental state of the SOF 
operator through helmet sensors to know if he is fatigued or not.  
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Laser-based eyewear technology displays images directly onto retinas while not 
blocking sight. It can be used in eyeglasses and has applications ranging from e-gaming 
to military defense.  In the next 10-20 years experts predict that Internet glasses will 
replace smartphones. This would enable operators to see building schematics and 
locations of enemy and friendly forces in the corner of their eyeglasses.  
2. Unmanned Systems 
It is expected that more and more unmanned systems will replace humans or 
manned systems at the front of the battlefield. Soldiers and operators will become more 
“remote controlled,” and will have larger amounts of unmanned systems at their disposal. 
Unmanned systems will become smaller and will be equipped with more advanced 
weapon systems. Also, range and lethality of these systems will improve. Since decision 
makers seem to get more options in the future, this will have implications on when, how 
and whether to deploy SOF.6 The flip side is that a wide range of unmanned systems will 
also become available to even low-tech opponents, both state and non-state actors. 
3. Non-Lethal Technology 
The third area of technology-driven innovation is nonlethal technology. It is 
expected that this could spark a whole new discussion on the jus in bello criteria on 
when, how and why to use deadly force if other alternatives to war are available. For 
example, laser weapons, frequency interference, gas and drugs can temporarily 
immobilize rather than do permanent physical damage to the enemy (Figure 23).  As the 
evolution of biometrics exploitation develops, the incentives and opportunities for 
cooperation between departments of defense and justice/interior around the world may 
increase further.   
Given the new technology innovations under development, it would be safe to 
assume that technology is major factor in innovative warfare.  However, technology is 
not the only driver of innovative warfare.  Next we turn to the topic of doctrine as an 
important driver of military innovation.  
                                                 
6 Colin Gray labels this the “expansion of choice” (Gray 1998). 
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B. DOCTRINAL INNOVATION 
Doctrine, a guide and standard frame of reference for military forces specifying 
how they conduct operations and accomplish their tasks, also can drive innovation.  As 
exemplified by the “blitzkrieg” of WWII, the Germans used the tank, an “old 
technology,” in ways to support mobile combined arms formations and maneuver warfare 
at the operational level.   
Military theoretician Edward Luttwak’s spectrum of warfare that ranges from 
attrition to manoeuver warfare explores some doctrinal options and tradeoffs. He argues 
that a well-managed, attrition-oriented force cannot be adaptive to the external 
environment (Luttwak 1983). By contrast, the closer an armed force is to the maneuver 
end of the spectrum, the more adaptive and externally focused it will be.  However, a 
military with high maneuver content cannot maximize internal efficiencies or set optimal 
organizational structure and methods. It must continually reconfigure itself for changing 
situations (Luttwak 1983). Thus, there is a trade-off between efficient international 
management and the environmental adaptations required in the maneuver model.  
Arguably, most SOF are in the maneuver end of the spectrum, although with 
today’s risk adversity and tendency for excessive use of fire power during operations, 
some appear to be moving towards the attrition end of the spectrum. In our view, 
NORSOF currently is operating within the maneuver end of the spectrum and it should 
move as far to the maneuver end as possible to be successful in the future. With regards 
to doctrine, this means NORSOF should be comfortable and ready with doctrinal 
innovations such as swarming and distributed operations. Swarming describes numbers 
of relatively small, synchronized operators and/or weapons that act faster than their 
opponents and in so doing defeats them. It can be executed by small teams or even 
empowered individual operators (see Appendix B). The technical innovations 
summarized above have the advantage in being able to offset any increased risks of 
committing limited manpower to swarming operations.   
As summarized in Figure 20, NORSOF also needs new doctrine for distributed 
operations to respond more effectively to a hybrid threat (see Appendix A). In such a 
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scenario, doctrine needs to be adjusted and developed in this civilian-led terrain.  
NORSOF likely will be working more closely with other government agencies (OGAs), 
as well as civilian partners and enablers. A stronger link between NORSOF and the 
Norwegian Home Guard units should be anticipated as well. Other developments not 
discussed but likely will impact doctrine are: (1) increasing vulnerability of large 
basecamps like FOBs and, (2) the adversaries’ increased use of advanced technology.   
 
• Integration of manned & unmanned 
systems
– Increase distance to adversaries, less 
risk to the force;
– New meaning and use of deception, 
discrete and clandestine 
operations/tactics.
• Increase emphasis on the maneuver 
side (attrition - maneuver - swarming) 
of the military spectrum
– Distributed operations – the swarm?
– Hybrid response to hybrid threats –
external focus and able to task organize;
– Integration with the civilian “domain,” -
SOF “lead” interagency (CT/AT) teams;
 
Figure 20. Doctrinal Innovation.  
Given the massive number of unmanned systems available, NORSOF also needs 
doctrine to guide the integration of manned and unmanned systems. The challenge of 
integrating multiple systems will only accelerate, and currently no SOF doctrine exists. In 
addition, unmanned and remote-controlled systems will enable SOF, in some missions, to 
increase the physical distance from their adversaries and at the same time increase their 
accuracy. Current tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) will need adjustment to 
benefit from these developments. Unmanned and remote controlled systems also will 
force SOF to rethink the concept of deception, discrete and clandestine operations.  They 
beg the question: Will the classic SR mission become obsolete or are humans still 
essential for mission success? Thus, much remains to be done to ensure that SOF 
doctrinal innovations are a part of innovative warfare.   
 39 
C. ORGANIZING TO FIGHT   
Organizing and preparing for every possible contingency is very difficult in 
maneuver warfare, but it is a key reason why task organizing remains essential to mission 
success. To date, NORSOF has proven to be more than capable in this area.  However, 
we believe three organizing options are central to NORSOF’s success in the future — the 
ability to develop and function in social networks; the establishment of an organizational 
unit that integrates research and development for innovation; and the redesign of 
NORSOF into a flatter and more flexible organization.   
1. Social Network Innovation   
Although the term social network is defined in academic disciplines as a 
connection between two or more entities, military references tend to define it as self-
organizing and emergent behavior among social actors in contrast to the controlled and 
top-down interactions driven by a hierarchical chain of command.  More and more we 
find that social networks offer an alternative organizing principle both for friendly (blue) 
and opposing (red) forces. And we should note that red is not necessarily a state actor. 
Today nations are already in war with social networks.   
Success in social networks is enabled with networked information and 
communication technology as illustrated in Figure 21.  Together the social network and 
the ICT network combine to constitute a new way to organize warfare.  As Dr. John 
Arquilla notes “it takes a network in order to fight a network.”  Currently, NORSOF is at 
the beginning stage of social network evolution and we advocate a greater emphasis on it 
in the future.   
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1. Our adversaries more sophisticated in 
utilizing social networks – building dark 
networks.
2. ICT innovations will enable coordination 
and span of control in future warfare; 
3. Future ICT infrastructure and capabilities 
allow instant access across the globe;
4. Virtual meeting places allows better 
planning and coordination.
 
Figure 21. The Networked World.  
2. Research & Development and Innovation  
We believe research and its development and coordination should have a central 
place in the future NORSOF organization (see Figure 22). We propose the establishment 
of a well-resourced, connected, and mandated unit that is responsible for finding, 
developing and implementing new technology, doctrine, and organizations. Furthermore, 
we recommend that the new entity be closely coordinated and networked with other 
interservice, interagency and international organizations to encourage the free-flow of 
ideas and innovations.  
Unit culture has to support this change and leadership plays a crucial role. As 
Lind et al. posited in an article in the Marine Corps Gazette of October 1989, the fourth 
generation warfare will be “technology driven.” As such, the authors contend that leaders 
“will have to be masters of both the art of war and technology.”  This point is further 
reinforced by Dr. John Arquilla, who believes that officers need to know what is 
technologically possible, in order to be effective innovators, a point to which we return to 
address in greater detail in subsequent chapters.  
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3. Flatter NORSOF Organization 
We anticipate technological innovations will enable NORSOF to become a flatter 
and more flexible organization (see Figure 22). The acceptable span of control is likely to 
increase as technological developments allow NORSOF to move away from a 
bureaucratic and conventional infrastructure. The organization may even question the 
need for garrisons and barracks to support teams, troops, and squadrons, as the options to 
work from home and the ability to team up when and where necessary become realistic. 
Such shifts will no doubt open up questions whether the six-man team continues to be the 
nucleus of the NORSOF organization or if technology and connectivity will enable teams 
to become even smaller. We will address these issues in more detail in the subsequent 
chapters of the report. 
• NORSOF 2025 should have a R&D Unit 
centrally placed in the organization 
– Well resourced and well connected;
– Increase technology awareness; 
– “Everybody is an innovator” mindset.
• NORSOF 2025 should be a flat, flexible 
organization to ensure speed, C2, 
OPSEC, and be a multi-tool
– Task organize, NORSOCOM leading 
operations, increased span of control;
– Smaller combat units with increased 
connectivity, range and effectiveness of 
weapons systems;
– Smaller teams dedicated to international 
and national UW/MA tasks.
 
Figure 22. Organizing for Warfare. 
D. INTEGRATION OF TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE AND ORGANIZING 
TO FIGHT     
Beyond the separate challenges of technology, doctrine and organizing to fight, 
the grand challenge of innovative warfare is integrating all three elements into a coherent 
whole. A range of possibilities exist:  we can “hedge our bets” by preparing for a broad 
range of contingencies; or we can put all efforts on one particular “big bet” that combines  
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technology, doctrine, and organization in unique and particular way. One example of a 
big bet option is outlined in Figure 23.  
• “Bet” on the integration of 
manned and unmanned/remote 
controlled systems
• Equip SOF operators with the 
latest technology to link into 
integrated systems
• Institutionalize innovation within 
the NORSOF organization and 
the SOF operator
 
Figure 23. Big Bet Strategy.  
A quick reality check tells us that a big bet such as the one outlined above is 
unlikely to be an option for NORSOF. Policy makers, who employ SOF as a “multi tool 
problem solver,” are unlikely to approve its technological specialization and integration 
into high tech systems, at least in the near future.  
Although we do not advocate a “big bet” solution, we do see the value for 
NORSOF in institutionalizing innovation within its organization. Encouraging, 
developing and implementing new ideas (whether they be technological, doctrinal, or 
organizational) will be key to NORSOF’s future.  Leadership and organizational culture, 
as noted above, have central roles in this transformation. Although creativity and 
operational/tactical innovation is a hallmark of SOF, high-level support and 
encouragement needs to be a core competency of the entire NORSOF system.   
 43 
VI. PEOPLE 
People are central to NORSOF’s 2025 future. Our aim in this chapter is to answer 
the following questions: Who are the people of NORSOF 2025? What knowledge, skills, 
abilities, and competencies7 do they require to perform their future tasks outlined in 
Chapter IV (Roe 2002)? Is the operator’s future baseline skill-set still based on a warrior-
foundation? Whatever answers we generate, they build on a fundamental “SOF truth:” 
“people are more important than hardware" (USSOCOM 2013). 
A. THE FUTURE NORSOF OPERATOR 
The competency requirements for future NORSOF operators are high based on 
our assessments of the future environment, NORSOF’s role as Norway’s strategic 
problem solvers, and the emerging challenges of innovative warfare (Chapter 5).  
Synchronizing feedback from the SMEs and the design team’s discussions, we have 
created a visual image of the future NORSOF operator as the "Warrior-Diplomat” 


























Figure 24.  Image of future NORSOF Operator. 
                                                 
7 "Knowledge" describes awareness or understanding and is acquired through education or experience. 
Knowledge is the body of facts, principles, theories and practices that is related to a field of work. "Skills" 
are proficiencies developed through training or experience to complete discipline-specific tasks. "Abilities" 
are innate attributes like cognitive abilities and personality traits. These are generally stable over time and 
half of the variance appears to be attributable to a person’s genetics rather than environment. "Competence" 
is the capability to apply knowledge, skills, and capabilities to do a job properly (Wikipedia, 2015). 
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The Warrior-Diplomat is a widely used term that typically refers to a thinking 
warrior with social skills, who is able to work and cooperate with non-military personnel. 
The design team elaborates on this concept to describe the future NORSOF Warrior-
Diplomat as:  
• a warrior with the highest proficiency in military skills and a master of 
warfare and technology; 
• a warrior with excellent political and cultural understanding, highly developed 
social competencies, empathy, and communication skills that enable him to 
lead and work with others  in an international and interagency environment; 
• a well-educated enabler who thinks strategically and is able to creatively 
develop and integrate SOF capabilities into a comprehensive “whole-of-
government” approach.  
B. CURRENT COMPETENCIES WITHIN NORSOF 
The current competency levels of operators within NORSOF are depicted using 
the pyramid in Figure 25.   


























Well versed in ICT






Figure 25.   Current Competency Pyramid. 
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Three assumptions are central to understanding the competency pyramid. First 
and foremost, we do not limit strategic thinking to the highest levels. The thinking 
warriors at the bottom of the pyramid, the “strategic corporals,” are expected to think 
strategically not just tactically (Krulak 1999). Second, the pyramid does not suggest a 
single career stream for all NORSOF operators. Based on the comprehensive set of 
current knowledge, skills, and competencies required in today’s environment, the 
pyramid assumes a lifetime career perspective in which multiple career paths are 
possible.  We explore the career paths in greater depth in the following chapter.  
Third, shape and colors of the pyramid are important.  The broad, green-colored 
foundation represents the attributes that form the baseline for NORSOF selection.  These 
innate abilities are relatively consistent across the Global SOF Network (GSN).  
The top portion of the pyramid is relatively narrow since the current system is not 
configured to select and create a large number of Warrior-Diplomats. We do not mean to 
imply that Warrior Diplomats don’t exist in today's NORSOF organization; rather, those 
with the highest aptitudes for these competencies tend to be hand-picked on an add-
needed basis.  
The middle yellow portion represents a transition zone from the Thinking-Warrior 
to the Warrior-Diplomat. This band represents skills and competencies that are developed 
from formal training, education, and operational experience. Currently, the system relies 
on operators who can quickly adapt and learn these skills. What is also important to note 
is that NORSOF does not have a comprehensive system to transition new operators from 
the baseline to the Warrior-Diplomat level. 
C. FUTURE COMPETENCIES FOR NORSOF 2025 
We represent the recommended shape of the 2025 competency pyramid in Figure 
26. The future pyramid is much wider at the top, meaning we anticipate an increase in 
operators with the highly developed competencies of a Warrior-Diplomat. The total 
number of operators for NORSOF 2025 does not have to increase to achieve this goal. 
What is required is the development of a comprehensive educational program and the 
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Figure 26.  Future Competency Pyramid. 
D. ACHIEVING HIGHER-LEVEL COMPETENCIES 
Increasing competency levels for operators and the whole organization cannot be 
achieved by simply increasing the selection standards or education requirements for 
future SOF candidates. Most of the higher-level competencies we identified are 
developed over time and on the job through the combination of training, education, and 
operational experience.  
The current timeline for an operator is limited to approximately 15 years (see 
Figure 27), unless the operator follows a career command track. Consequently, after the 
SOF-candidate successfully passes selection, NORSOF  has a very limited time (after 
subtracting basic training, missions abroad, mandatory DoD education time etc.) to assess 
and exploit the candidate’s potential. This time frame limits NORSOF’s ability to 
develop an increasing number of Warrior-Diplomats. 
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A Life-Time Perspective changes 
the focus of selection, training, 
education, and career 
management
 
Figure 27.  Shift to a SOF Life-Time Perspective. 
One alternative to developing higher-level competencies is to change the SOF 
operator perspective, both on behalf of the organization and the individual. We 
recommend a career management system with a tailored education and training program 
that focuses on individual aptitudes to fully exploit the potential of operators. This life-
time perspective aims to maximize the output of the operators and their potential over a 
career that can span up to 38 years.   
This shift to a life-time SOF-career perspective implies major changes in the 
focus of selection, training, education, administration and Human Resources 
Management, a subject to which we now turn. 
E. RE-SHAPING THE COMPETENCIES PYRAMID 
There are three new segments to the pyramid that represent the gap between the 
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Refine selection with 




Refine existing doctrine and 
develop new processes/ 
subsystems to optimize:
• Life-Time career perspective
• Career management




Figure 28.  Reshaping the Competency Pyramid. 
Starting at the bottom, the major focus of the NORSOF selection process would 
be on finding the best warriors with the highest potential for future development. Today's 
NORSOF selection is already very effective, but it could be improved by shifting the 
focus to attributes that contribute to the development of the Warrior-Diplomat. 
Specifically, we recommend that selection increase its focus on: 
• Cognitive Abilities 
• Independence 
• Interpersonal skills 
Central to this selection are criteria that single out candidates who have the 
specific psychological attributes, personality traits, and cognitive abilities necessary for 
successful performance under unusual and demanding conditions (Kennedy et al. 2012). 
A large number of psychological studies of different high-risk operational personnel 
document the validity of cognitive ability and personality tests and their combination as 
best predictors of above-average work performance (Schmitt 2012, 2014).  
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To increase levels 2 and 3 of the pyramid, a comprehensive and tailorable system 
for career management, education, PME, and training is required.  This system should 
manage operators’ careers based on their aptitudes and interests rather than taking a “one 
size fits all” approach. In addition, the pyramid requires a shift in the selection criteria 
away from the physical attributes more towards a cognitive/interpersonal focus that 
reflects the challenges of future tasks and innovative warfare as described in Chapters IV 
and V. We do not mean to imply that physical standards should be reduced; rather, we 
believe that cognition and personality should be emphasized. Finally, we believe 
NORSOF’s education system should leverage existing Norwegian Defense resources, as 
well as interagency assets, as we view education a national mission and not just SOF’s 
responsibility.  
F. NORSOF FUTURE SELECTION 
Future NOFSOF selection should consist of two channels (see Figure 29). One 
channel should continue the current arrangement and select operators based on innate 
attributes, while a second channel should focus on competencies for highly qualified 
subject matter experts. We envision these experts will serve as "in-house" providers who 



































Figure 29.  Whole of Society Selection Process. 
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The current system of recruiting experts is ad-hoc based on "word of mouth." We 
propose formalizing the process. We recommend recruiting experts at each level of the 
2025 pyramid by promoting the SOF brand throughout the Norwegian Defense 
community. We anticipate the need for all types of experts from the tactical level e.g. 
EOD dog handlers to the strategic level e.g. negotiators and innovators. Believing that 
people are central to the success of NORSOF, we recommend selecting and developing 
them with a two-pronged process based on their individual attributes and competencies. 
G. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
To master the challenges of the future, Norway will need SOF operators with a 
strong warrior foundation, who have the potential to develop competencies that will meet 
the Warrior-Diplomat requirements. Consequently, we recommend that NORSOF: 
• Maintain a large recruiting pool of conscripts and "off-the-street" candidates 
in order to attract people from all backgrounds and professions; 
• Create a life-time SOF career perspective and career management system as a 
framework to develop highly skilled people that build a warrior culture; 
• Create a tailored education and training system to exploit the potential of the 
operator, focusing on individual aptitudes rather than a "one size fits all" 
approach; 
• Examine the selection process and criteria for future operators and shift  the 
focus on innate attributes that enable growth into Warrior-Diplomats  
(cognitive abilities, independence, interpersonal skills); 
• Formalize the selection process for high-level experts to ensure the organic 
integration of competent subject matter experts; 
• Promote the SOF brand throughout the Norwegian Defense to recruit SOF-
candidates and experts. 
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VII. SUB-SYSTEM: HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (HRM) 
Building on the recommendations in Chapter VI, we begin this chapter by taking 
a life-long perspective on careers to flesh out three options open to operators:  Command 
track, Operator/SME track, and Warrior/Diplomat track. Next we consider alternatives to 
train and educate these operators, and pay particular attention to the development and  
management of SOF “communities of practice” (CoPs). We conclude with suggestions 
on how to increase and sustain innovative CoP networks that span interservice, 
interdepartmental, and international boundaries.  
A. CAREER TRACKS AND THEIR PROGRESSION 
A life-long perspective on careers opens up the opportunity for NORSOF to 
design several career tracks for various groups within the SOF community in order to 
build on people’s strengths and interests. We recommend that NORSOF formalize three 
distinct career tracks: Command, Operator/Subject Matter Expert (SME), and Warrior-
Diplomat. Each track is expected to develop its own program goals to support training 




















Figure 30.  Multiple Career Tracks. 
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The current conscription selection process, at the base of the figure, creates an 
excellent pool of service candidates.  Ideally, candidates will enter an all-hands selection 
course before splitting off into specialized units for advanced training. 
NORSOF’s active recruiting program is also expected to attract top talent from 
the General Purpose Forces (GPF).  The goal will be to bring in more mature candidates 
(25+ years) so that their basic core skills and education would have been provided by the 
General Purpose Force. The advantage of candidates over 25 years is that they tend to 
make better life decisions due to completed brain development. Men’s brains are not fully 
developed until approximately 25 years old (Casey, Jones and Hare 2014). NORSOF also 
benefits from this arrangement by fostering stronger ties and better understanding with 
the GPF units. 
Once all-hands selection and training are complete the new NORSOF operator 
starts a career track in his tactical unit. Currently there is a well-structured Command 
track for those who stay on it and an ad hoc “non-Command track” for those who do not 
wish to be or should not be in command.   
B. THE WARRIOR-DIPLOMAT 
Building on the two career tracks, we suggest the creation of a Warrior-Diplomat 
career track consisting of operators who leave the Operator/SME track and commanders 
who have left the Command track.  Thus, over time, we expect the pyramids of the 
Operator/SME and Command tracks to narrow, while the Warrior-Diplomat track widens 
as shown in Figure 31. 
There are many reasons for these shifts but the most obvious are that operators 
and SMEs have shorter “shelf-life” due to the physical demands of their work. On the 
Command track, as rank increases the number of command positions decreases therefore 
creating a natural pyramid. The real question lies in what these former operators and 
commanders do once they come off their earlier career tracks. It is here we see 







Operators and Commanders become Warrior-Diplomats over time

















Figure 31.  The Warrior-Diplomat. 
To harness the power and potential of these seasoned operators and commanders, 
we recommend that NORSOF formalize a Warrior-Diplomat career track. Just as training 
and education enhance the skill sets of operators and commanders, training and education 
can be tailored to meet the requirements of the Warrior-Diplomat.    
C. CAREER TRACK EXAMPLES 
NORSOF career tracks should not be separate stovepipes but offer opportunity 
and flexibility to move through them at different career milestones as we illustrate in 
Figure 32.  For example, we show personnel in the Command track moving into the 
Warrior-Diplomat track, personnel from the Warrior-Diplomat track moving into the 
Operator/SME track, and personnel from the Operator/SME track moving into the 
Warrior-Diplomat track.  
The milestones are very similar for all three tracks, but the Command track starts 
earlier and is structured around training and education to prepare an operator for greater 
responsibilities as a future Commander and decision maker. The Operator/SME track 
focuses more on operational experience, tactics and training with less influence on 
education. The Warrior-Diplomat is the hybrid track in which people can migrate to and 

















































































Figure 32.  NORSOF Career Management Sub-System. 
  For visualization purposes the Warrior-Diplomat career track is depicted as 
spanning an entire career.  It contains the majority of the NORSOF members over 40 
years old.  There are several paths that a Warrior-Diplomat can take.  Examples range 
from a staff officer at an Embassy, a military advisor on an international mission, a 
liaison officer between units, and a PhD expert in a technical area.  Whatever their roles, 
training and education are essential to keep them active and engaged in their chosen areas 
of interest.  
D. HIGHER EDUCATION ALTERNATIVES FOR NORSOF 
The complex  and dynamic environment NORSOF faces in the future points to 
the need for well-educated and well-trained personnel who can use theory to inform 
practice. In addition to the small numbers of operators who get their bachelor degrees 
through the Army, Navy, and Air Force Academies, we recommend opening up options 
for a SOF-specific bachelor degree to increase the numbers of operators who get higher 
education. Figure 33 shows this SOF degree-program alongside the services’ traditional 
bachelor degree-programs. 
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Service Academy Bachelor Warrior Diplomat / SME Bachelor?
Military and Civilian Master Programs
 
Figure 33.  Alternatives in Higher Education. 
We believe that educating SOF personnel in service institutions will continue to 
be important. However, we recommend the creation of a tailored program for the SOF 
operator.  Such a program would likely draw from the best of each service programs and 
introduce SOF-specific courses where appropriate such as  the one already established at 
the Norwegian Naval Academy. In addition, a bachelor-level version of courses offered 
by the Naval Postgraduate School would be beneficial, as would a flexible program that 
utilizes relevant courses at various civilian institutions. We further recommend a head of 
SOF education be appointed to oversee such a program. The timeframe for program 
completion could extend over several years to be compatible with operational 
requirements. 
E. COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE NETWORKS  
Thus far we have concentrated on the formal training and education individuals. 
Recent research suggests using communities of practice as an alternative to develop 
people’s knowledge, skills, and competencies (Cambridge, Kaplan and Suter 2005). A 
community of practice (CoP) is defined as: 
“a group of people who share a common concern, a set of problems, or interest in 
a topic and who come together to fulfill both individual and group goals. A CoP 
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often focuses on sharing best practices and creating new knowledge to advance a 
domain of professional practice and interaction on an ongoing basis is an 
important part of this” (Cambridge, Kaplan and Suter 2005).  
CoPs are important for NORSOF for several reasons. SOF expertise challenges 
personnel to master numerous knowledge fields and a wide ranging set of competencies 
essential to their tasks and problem sets. Formal training and education programs, while 
important, can never cover all the required competencies. Continual learning and 
development through CoPs can fill an important void. Furthermore, they offer a new 
model of learning that emphasizes knowledge sharing across organizational and national 
boundaries. Personnel learn to work together and share their knowledge for individual, 
group, and organizational development. These cross-boundary collaborations are 
becoming increasingly important in our interdependent world.  
A structured way of combining CoPs with a life-long career program is illustrated 
in Figure 34. In the center of the CoP is an “owner” of a CoP topic e.g. a particular 
weapon system. The owner and members of the community then build a network of 
people interested in the topic among users, manufacturers, weapons instructors, SMEs, 
and academics etc. A range of interactions are possible from informal online connections 







































Figure 34.  Example of a CoP Network. 
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According to Etienne Wenger (2015), three elements would be present when a 
CoP forms around a topic. It would contain a knowledge domain (what the community 
knows), a community of people (a network of individuals interested in the topic), and 
practice (interactions and discussion about how to improve what they do).    
Knowledge has become the key to success, but it is not just formal classroom 
knowledge. As McDermott (1999) points out, the knowledge of experts requires the 
“accumulation of experience—a kind of “residue” of  their actions, thinking and 
conversations—that remains a dynamic part of their ongoing experience. Knowledge 
resides in the skills, understanding, and relationships of its members as well as in the 
tools, documents, and processes that embody aspects of this knowledge.”    
We concur with McDermott’s assessment and consequently recommend creating 
multiple CoPs as vehicles to develop and sustain SOF’s unique knowledge domains.  
Figure 35 illustrates different CoPs integrated with the proposed R & D and 
innovation unit. Working in tandem, they can build and sustain CoP networks, or 























Figure 35.  Competency Networks Linked with R & D. 
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F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
We recommend that NORSOF establish a lifelong perspective on careers that 
integrates the selection, education and training of the force. In addition, we recommend 
three career tracks (Command, Operator/SME/, Warrior-Diplomat) in order to support the 
SOF community’s wide-ranging requirements and people’s unique strengths and 
interests. In our view, education and training should be formal and informal, academic 
and practical. We have highlighted both formal programs and the importance of strong 
CoP networks within units, across units, and with external stakeholders in SOF-relevant 
knowledge and competency domains.  
Specific recommendations with respect to HRM are: 
• Develop an all-hands selection course before new recruits split off into 
specialized units for advanced training. 
• Exploit experience of the 35+ year old NORSOF operators by creating more 
Warrior-Diplomats. 
• Formalize career tracks for Operators/SMEs & Warrior Diplomats. 
• Develop a formal SOF academic pipeline. 
• Harness talents and experience of GPF soldiers by recruiting them into SOF.  
• Link the proposed Research and Development and Innovation unit with CoP 
networks to ensure continued knowledge development and innovation within 
SOF.  
• Establish a high-level position for a seasoned operator to design and manage the 
various CoPs along the lines of network theorists’ description of a network 
administrative organization (see for instance Milward and Provan 2006). 
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VIII. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
This chapter recommends NORSOF’s organizational structure for 2025. As an 
enabler, organizational structure supports and facilitates NORSOF’s direction, guiding 
principles and its design factors: Tasks, Innovative Warfare, People, and the HRM 
Subsystem. Thus, the major question we address is what kind of structure does NORSOF 
need in 2025 to ensure a successful execution of its direction and design? We lay the 
groundwork with a brief overview of NORSOF’s current structure. Next, we outline our 
major recommendations for structural change. We end with five variations for tactical 
subunit organization. 
A. CURRENT NORSOF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Figure 36 illustrates a simplified view of Norway’s Defense Organization with an 
overlay of the Norwegian map showing NORSOF’s five base locations: Oslo 














Figure 36.  Current Norwegian Defense Organization and NORSOF Bases. 
At the head of the Norwegian Armed Forces is the Chief of Defense (CHOD), a 
four star position. The CHOD has several Commands reporting to him, one of which is 
NORSOF, commanded by a two star who is responsible for force generation. Besides the 
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Army, Navy, Air Force, Home Guard, Intelligence, Logistics and Cyber Commands, 
there is a Norwegian Joint Head Quarters (NJHQ), commanded by a three star. NJHQ is 
responsible for Operational Command of the Norwegian units on deployment.  
Currently, COMNORSOF can generate forces from two SOF units: FSK and 
MJK.  Both units are capable of conducting full spectrum SOF operations, although FSK 
is more land-focused and MJK more maritime-focused. Both units are able to backfill 
each other in case of extended deployments or campaigns (e.g. OEF/ISAF). For the last 
30 years, FSK has assumed primary responsibility for domestic Counter Terrorism (CT), 
in both maritime and land domains, while MJK entered the domestic CT arena in 2013. 
B. RECOMMENDED CHANGES IN NORSOF STRUCTURE 
Our recommendations for structural change draw on the framework for organizing 
Innovative Warfare in Chapter V: the importance of networks in future warfare;  the need 
for a Research & Development unit to coordinate innovation; and the redesign of 
NORSOF into a flatter and more flexible organization.  Building on this foundation, we 
recommend five changes: NORSOCOM’s operational command over its forces; the 
establishment of a Research and Development cell; the creation of a SOF reserve unit to 
support active duty SOF; the creation of a SOF air group; and the establishment of a 
training detachment.    
1. NORSOCOM  
In addition to his current responsibility of force generation, we recommend that 
COMNORSOF has operational command over his forces, which will improve the ability 
to quickly launch a comprehensive, integrated effort across governmental agencies. He 
should be responsible for coordination and integration for international deployments and 
domestic operations in support of the Justice Department and other governmental 
agencies. The additional responsibilities would require three changes to the current 
NORSOCOM structure: 
(1) NORSOCOM’s manning would need to be more robust in all staff 
sections, especially in Operations and Future Plans. The required 
personnel to build this robust staff could be taken from the unit level since 
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some of the responsibilities would shift from that level to COMNORSOF 
level. 
(2) COMNORSOF would have his own Liaison Officers (LNOs), working at 
NJHQ but reporting to him. 
(3) NORSOCOM would have a section conducting strategic liaison and 
interservice, interdepartmental and international coordination on his 
behalf. 
In addition, the recommended changes in Chapter VII require elevation of the 
HRM function. We therefore recommend the positioning a new group somewhere 
between COMNORSOF and DCOM to oversee the development and management of the 
proposed lifetime career program that is essential to future force generation and 
operations.  
2. Research and Development  
The design team recommends the establishment of a Research and Development 
(R & D) cell. Well connected to innovative interservice, interdepartmental, international 
networks, it would be charged with generating new ideas, developing them and 
overseeing their field implementation to ensure ongoing innovations in technology, 
organization, and doctrine.  By the nature of its tasks, the Research and Development 
Cell would require more experienced and mature operators and technical experts drawn 
from NORSOF (e.g. Operators/SMEs and Warrior-Diplomats), Norwegian Armed 
Forces, and other governmental agencies. 
Given the “advent of Netwar” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1996) the cell also should 
have capabilities in the cyber-domain as well to provide technical support to the tactical 
units in the event no “off the shelf” ICT solutions are available.  
Thus, we see the R & D Cell as responsible for the following:  
• Networked research and development activities to generate new ideas 
about SOF’s technology, ways of organizing, and doctrine.  
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• Support and oversight of the integration and implementation of the new 
ideas into the field as innovative practice.  
• Custom technical support, including cyber, to the tactical teams. 
3. SOF Reserve Unit 
We recommend the formation of a NORSOF Reserve Unit to counter the Hybrid 
War threat and strengthen NORSOF’s capacity. NORSOF currently makes use of reserve 
SOF operators, but only on a small scale, mainly as backfill for single-position 
assignments in tactical units and staffs. We propose the establishment of a formal reserve 
unit managed, commanded and coordinated by NORSOCOM with close links to the 
Home Guard (Figure 37). Possible tasks of this Reserve Unit could include:  
• Support Homeland Defense: Units would be small and dispersed, ideally in 
the provinces in which the officers already live.  
• Establish or support local community operations and intelligence centers in 
order to provide situational awareness and ensure rapid response to a variety 
of potential threats. 
• Train the Home Guard in guerilla warfare. 










Figure 37.  NORSOF Reserve Unit and its Direct Ties.  
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When attaching a small SOF reserve team to a Home Guard unit, COMNORSOF 
should have OPCOM over the teams that would train with the Home Guard. Each team 
also should have geographical responsibility and pre-planned missions and have their 
military equipment stored at home.  
A major advantage of establishing a Reserve SOF unit is its ability to retain the 
talent and experiences of well-trained personnel. By linking reserve units with active duty 
personnel NORSOF builds a more robust network of SOF operators.  
4. Special Operations Air Group  
To improve flexibility and integration of air assets in NORSOF the design team 
also recommends the formation of a Special Operations Air Group (SOAG) with the 
following tasks: 
• Provide ISR through the use of UAV. 
• Provide Rotary Wing (RW) and Fixed Wing (FW) platforms to support 
NORSOF operations domestic and international. 
• Provide Joint Fires to NORSOF units. 
Complex NORSOF operations often require the use of RW. In order to fully 
support NORSOF’s missions, the RW pilots require specialized flying skills and a 
thorough understanding of mission profiles. Also, quick and detailed planning under 
time-compressed circumstances is often required. Given the above mentioned 
requirements, we believe NORSOF should have its own organic RW capability.  
In addition, we believe strategic airlift should be dedicated to NORSOF. In this 
case, strict and formalized agreements need to be made with the Air Force, the MoD and 
NORSOF regarding priorities in missions, notice to move timings and training hours.   
5. Training Detachment 
The study group believes all-hands selection and the basic operator course will 
result in an efficient use of instructors and training facilities and will improve 
interoperability within NORSOF. We therefore recommend the formation of a Training 
Detachment. It would have the following tasks: 
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• Recruit from all units within the Armed Forces, including conscripts 
• Select  new recruits 
• Provide a basic operator course after selection 
An additional task of the Training Detachment would be to safeguard NORSOF’s 
Arctic and maritime fighting skills. These skills are essential to protect Norway’s 
domestic and international interests identified in Chapter IV (Tasks) and Chapter VI 
(People). Once the operator finishes the basic operator course, he will receive additional 
specialized training at the tactical unit to which he is assigned.  
Figure 38 below illustrates how all five recommended changes might be 
combined into one structural design.  
 
Figure 38.  Organizational Structure, Recommendations in Dark Grey. 
C. TACTICAL UNIT OPTIONS 
 The next question the design team tackled is how to structure the tactical units.  
We identified five options which are illustrated in Figure 39: 




































Figure 39.  NORSOF Tactical Unit Structures (Dark Grey). 
(1) Domain Option: This option has two tactical units which originate from the 
Navy and the Army. The units are intended to focus on the maritime and land 
domains respectively. The distinctions between land and maritime are more 
pronounced compared to the current structure.  However, they do keep some 
overlap, although the design team did not specify what the overlaps in tasks and 
responsibilities should be.  
(2) Domain Hybrid Option: This option is similar to the domain option, although 
however, it calls for a separate CT unit dedicated to conducting CT and HRO 
nationally and internationally. The CT unit would select experienced operators 
from the Army SOF and Navy SOF units. The goal is to have all CT unit 
operators older than 25 years to ensure experienced and mature operators across 
the board. 
(3) Task Based Option: This option has dedicated units for Strike, Special 
Warfare and SR tasks. It is built on the assumption that these tasks are unique 
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enough to require different types of personnel. Operators would be selected for 
one of those tasks based on their skill sets and personality. 
(4) Merged Option: This model merges the tactical units into one single SOF-unit 
responsible for all domains and tasks. 
(5) Modularized and Networked Option: This model organizes tactical units in 
small teams and modular units that are either concentrated or dispersed depending 
on the mission. Their structures are more network-like compared to traditional 
hierarchical military organizations. They are also reliant on ICT capability to be 
fully designed and implemented. Figure 44 provides a tactical-level view of a 
network configuration. Ad hoc tactical modules in the center draw personnel and 
resources from force providers and enablers and communicate directly with 
NORSOCOM. Once deployed, depending on the mission, the network could be 
more complex and include, among others, international partners, local 
government actors and NGO’s.  
 
Figure 40.  Modularized and Networked Option.  
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All five options have strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages.  
Since the design team did not reach consensus on a recommended tactical unit structure, 
we offer these five options for future consideration.   
Whatever option might be chosen, we want to underscore an important point. On 
the unit level as well as for NORSOF as a whole, a flat organizational structure is 
preferable. Flat structures minimize bureaucracy, allow for short and clear 
communication, and ensure greater flexibility and adaptation to environmental changes. 
We offer the example in Figure 41 what a tactical unit might look like. Troops are 
functionally organized (e.g. CT/HRO/DA, SR, MA and land mobility) and supported by a 
pool of enablers created from staff both inside or outside of NORSOF. A Task Force (TF) 
is formed drawing on the troops and enablers appropriate to the mission.  An on-scene 
Commander leads the TF.    
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Figure 41.  Task Organizing Structure Recommendations. 
D. SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In summary, the design team recommends the following with respect to 
NORSOF’s future organizational structure:  
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• A changing role for NORSOCOM that integrates responsibility for force 
generation and operations.  
• The creation of a new Research and Development Cell to keep NORSOF 
technology, doctrine, and  organization at the cutting edge of innovative 
warfare.   
• The development of a SOF Reserve unit that works closely with the 
Norwegian Home Guard. 
• The creation of a new Special Operations Air Group. 
• The creation of a new Training Detachment. 
• Five options for NORSOF tactical units that need further elaboration and 
research.  
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IX. KEY THEMES 
The design team finalizes this report with five major themes from the NORSOF 
2025 study: the future of warfare and its challenges; NORSOF as a strategic instrument; 
the growing emphasis on Military Assistance (MA) and Unconventional Warfare (UW); 
the new technology of warfare; and the importance of innovation.   
A. FUTURE WARFARE AND ITS CHALLENGES 
Future warfare will go beyond the 
military domain, challenging traditional 
organizations and doctrines
• Future conflicts: a hybrid of all types of 
warfare
• Inter-service, inter-departmental and 
international cooperation critical for 
success and a primary task for 
NORSOF
 
Figure 42. Future Warfare. 
Future conflicts likely will combine high and low tech and high and low intensity 
warfare and tactics within the same area of operation, often referred to as hybrid warfare. 
The Ukraine conflict and the last Israel-Lebanese war are recent examples (Metz 2015).  
This type of modern warfare will require flexibility from operators, staff and 
commanders (Chapters VII, VI, IV, VIII).  
One anticipated consequence of hybrid warfare is the movement of Norway 
beyond the military domain into the civilian domain. Greater coordination and 
collaboration among Norway’s diplomatic, informational, military and economic (DIME) 
efforts will be required. Although NORSOF already has demonstrated effective 
coordination during crises, even higher levels of inter-service, interdepartmental, and 
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international collaboration between military and civilian organizations at all levels will be 
needed in the future. Thus, new doctrine will need to be written to govern these 
interactions and new ways of organizing military units to link up with their counterparts 
in the civilian sector will have to be devised.   
In addition, maintaining strong connections with originating services will be 
important to maintain continuity and to keep future leaders of NORSOF well integrated 
with the rest of the Norwegian Armed Forces.  Recruiting directly from the other services 
and rotating personnel in and out of important units and staffs in the conventional 
military are advisable to improve collaboration. Retaining LNOs within the Navy, Army, 
Air force and Home Guard Staffs to promote close cooperation within the Norwegian 
Armed Forces joint operations are also encouraged (Chapters VI, VIII), (Cox 2014), 
(Fuentes 2015), (Hoehn, Robbert and Harrel 2011), (McLeary 2015). 
Norway, a peaceful nation with few military ambitions besides self-protection, 
needs to maintain its alliances with NATO and Nordic countries. NATO Special 
Operations Head Quarters (NSHQ) and the Global SOF Network (GSN) are excellent 
vehicles to develop and sustain these commitments as are NORSOF LNOs who should be 
sent to close allies to strengthen the NATO-SOF partnership and expand the GSN 
(Chapters II, IV and VIII). As a small-nation SOF, NORSOF also will be expected to use 
its arctic, littoral and maritime expertise in these areas and provide training and advice to 
its allies and partners (Chapter IV). In return, allied partners will be expected to provide 




B. NORSOF AS A STRATEGIC INSTRUMENT 
NORSOF should be transformed 
to a truly strategic instrument
• Policy by CONOP
• Recruiting, developing, employing 
and retaining key personnel 
accordingly
• Life cycle perspective on personnel
 
Figure 43.  NORSOF as a Strategic Instrument. 
NORSOF should be utilized as a strategic instrument in the protection of 
Norwegian sovereignty, homeland defense and security, alliance (both Article 5 and 
expeditionary) and coalition work. For example, it could recommend operations in 
support of policy and influence policy by identifying opportunities in sync with national 
interests. Currently, the knowledge of NORSOF’s capabilities is limited and needs to be 
better understood among government officials so that its expertise can better support 
Norwegian interests (Chapters IV, VI and VII).   
People with the Warrior-Diplomat knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to 
operate on a strategic level are currently a scarce resource in NORSOF. In order to 
increase the number of personnel in the upper levels of the competencies pyramid, as 
described in Chapter IV, we recommend a shift at the selection level towards a more 
cognitive/interpersonal focus. Through increased emphasis on education and lifecycle 
career planning, highly educated and experienced operators can be developed for the 
strategic role. By establishing three distinct carrier tracks–SME, Warrior-Diplomat, and 
Command–NORSOF will ensure that all crucial personnel categories have an education 
option and can be retained until retirement (Chapters VI, VII and VIII).  
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C. MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE 
Military Assistance and 
Unconventional Warfare:
• NORSOF should focus on building 
local capabilities
• Utilizing experienced operators 
ending active duty in reserve for 
national UW tasks
 
Figure 44. Military Assistance and Unconventional Warfare. 
It is difficult to predict operational demands for SOF in the future. However, 
enabling allied countries and partner nations by advising or training their security forces 
(Military Assistance) is likely to be increasingly important and effective. There are many 
arenas for MA. Eastern Europe, Middle East, Asia and Africa are likely grounds for 
building capable and lasting local forces. NORSOF also should attempt to build forces 
with a similar mindset and positive attitude towards the West which in the future could 
contribute to mutual security efforts (Chapter IV).  
Norwegian Armed Forces will be on the strategic defensive in case of foreign 
aggression or threats against Norway’s sovereignty. NORSOF should prepare for this 
mission by creating a distributed SOF Reserve unit to utilize former operators. The unit 
should report to the NORSOCOM but the operators would train with the Home Guard in 
guerilla warfare operations in their home province. Their task would be to contribute in a 
Norwegian UW campaign against an aggressor; and they should also be prepared to 
conduct unsupported intention-based operations (Chapters IV and VIII).   
 73 
D. FUTURE TECHNOLOGY OF WARFARE 
Future technology of warfare 
requires:
• An independent, dispersed, highly 
maneuverable, well connected and 
flat organization 
• Increased cooperation, speed, 
precision, flexibility and OPSEC
 
Figure 45. Future Technology of Warfare. 
Technology improvements will influence the way NORSOF organizes and fights 
in the future. Our analysis in Chapter V on innovative warfare, supported by David 
Kilcullen (2013), points in the direction of more mobile teams with more lethal 
technology at their disposal. Troop, patrol, pair and individual operations are more likely 
scenarios than squadron operations. Squadrons will perhaps mainly be a peacetime 
organization, as larger units will be more vulnerable to longer-range precision weapons. 
To succeed, the ability to maneuver quickly to execute missions will be essential 
(Chapter V). Thus NORSOF as an organization needs to be flexible, adaptable, and 
highly maneuverable, suggesting a flatter organizational design.  
A flat organization will help establish short feedback loops between the operators, 
Ground Force Commander, J3 Operations and NORSOF commanders. Furthermore this 
type of design will ensure that all key personnel have necessary situational awareness to 
enable quick and precise responses and decisions (Chapter V and VIII). In addition, an 
increasingly networked and ICT driven operational environment will enable better 
coordination among the units, although greater vulnerability to cyber-attacks (Chapter V) 
should be anticipated and defended against 
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E. INNOVATION AND RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
Innovation and R&D at the 
center of the organization
• Everybody is a innovator mindset 
from operator to commander
• Experienced operators blended 
with research experts in the center 
of the NORSOF organization to 
fuel technological, organizational 
and doctrinal innovation 
 
Figure 46. Innovation and R & D. 
Innovation in research and development is central to NORSOF’s future success 
(Chapters V and VII). However, it is difficult to ensure an innovative NORSOF in a strict 
and hierarchic military bureaucracy. Instead, NORSOF needs to have “safe” places where 
NORSOF units, commanders and employees have the freedom to try out new ideas, 
equipment and tactics. They need to work in a supportive culture that allows them to 
generate and experiment with new ideas, learn from mistakes rather than be punished for 
their failures. Such a safe space would recruit unconventional and creative thinkers 
(Chapters V and VIII). The new proposed safe space would be the R & D unit, a hub for 
technological, organizational and doctrinal innovation. It would integrate experienced 
Warrior-Diplomat and SME operators with strategic knowledge, and cutting edge 
researchers and technology experts to coordinate and create new solutions for today’s and 




To conclude our NORSOF 2025 study we turn to the purpose which launched this 
study:  to challenge traditional thinking and create innovative solutions for the future of 
NORSOF 2025 
A. UNIQUENESS OF RESULTS 
There are a number of studies and initiatives looking into the crystal ball to 
predict the future for Special Operations Forces. To assess the level of uniqueness in the 
NORSOF 2025 study the findings should be compared against two lines of previous 
studies: First, the dominant international view as advocated by USSOCOM in its vision 
for 2020 and reinforced by and through a number of (mainly U.S.) academic studies, e.g. 
(Maxwell 2013), (Thomas and Dougherty 2013). Second, the line of studies already 
conducted for NORSOF by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI).  
The NORSOF 2025 study recommends NORSOF should be: transformed to be a 
truly strategic instrument; configured to be a flexible, adaptable, highly maneuverable, 
well connected network with a flat organization structure; re-organized to support 
interservice, interdepartmental and international cooperation; redesigned to integrate 
R&D and organizational innovation; reoriented to increase its emphasis on Military 
Assistance and Unconventional Warfare; and renewed to take a life-long perspective on 
career development with multiple career tracks activated to recruit, select, train, educate 
and retain the right personnel.  
 It may be argued that few, if any, of these recommendations individually are 
unique as most have previously been put forward by others in one form or another. 
However, if you look at the combination of recommendations, dive deeper into the 
underlying analysis, and apply the Norwegian context, this is a unique set of solutions 
that have not existed or been proposed in Norway before. If these were fully 
implemented, NORSOF in 2025 would be a quite different organization from the current 
NORSOF. In this sense, the study has arguably succeeded in adding value to NORSOF’s 
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long-term planning process. This was also the feedback given by the sponsor to the 
students after the presentation of the study in May 2015. 
B. UNIQUENESS OF DESIGN THINKING APPROACH  
There are several ways to produce a unique result. We chose Design Thinking 
methodology due to its insistence on creativity and its iterative approach to problem 
solving. Accepting the premise that our study has produced unique results, this seems to 
have been a good choice of method. The question is, however, to which extent it was the 
method, the process, the individuals or the group dynamics which contributed the most.  
Although not scientifically supported, a quick survey among the study group’s 
members during a wrap-up and lessons learned session indicated that Design Thinking 
may have encouraged creativity to a greater extent compared to more traditional planning 
processes. This difference is particularly visible in the later stages of the processes. 
Whereas traditional linear approaches to problem solving may include an initial creative 
session, they have, over time, a tendency to become a more programming exercise for the 
decided course of action. Design Thinking allowed, and even encouraged creativity until 
the final product was delivered. Although eventually leading to a better result, the flip-
side to the creativity was students’ impression of a more chaotic, unpredictable, and at 
times frustrating process than previously experienced in more traditional planning 
processes. 
C. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NEXT STUDY  
Design Thinking methodology was arguably crucial in producing a valuable and 
unique study for our sponsor, and the methodology should be considered highly relevant 
and potentially beneficial to complex problem-solving processes where creativity and 
innovative solutions are sought, both within military and civilian domains. Design 
Thinking is however not magic, and does not guarantee success. There was a limit to the 
innovative character of our results, and we did not manage to resolve all issues within our 
limited timeframe. Some general lessons learned were that to make it work, you need the 
following: 
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• Sponsorship for the design challenge 
• Time allocated depending on the design challenge 
• People trained and practiced with the process 
• Skilled designers & facilitators guiding the efforts 
• Space to work 
An additional lesson learned is that it might be useful to introduce certain 
elements from more linear processes, e.g. timeline with milestones, decision points etc, to 
keep track of the process and ensure sufficient progress.  
A final recommendation is to carefully point out the characteristics of Design 
Thinking to the sponsor and other relevant audiences before findings are presented. In 
order to prepare them for the fact that results and presentations may come in an 
unconventional and unfamiliar structure, it is important to stress the fact that the design 
process varies greatly from a traditional military linear planning process. 
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APPENDIX A:  HYBRID WARFARE 
1. Introduction 
The NORSOF 2025 study group identified Hybrid Warfare as an emerging threat 
to NATO countries. To explore the wide range of instruments and actions that might go 
into a hybrid/unconventional attack we organized a wargame with the assistance from 
other officer students at NPS.8 The wargame was executed at NPS in May 2015 and 
included approximately 20 international subject matter experts with diverse backgrounds 
from academia and the defense sector.   
The wargame was constructed to identify an aggressor’s possible order of battle 
and probable course of action. Insights were later used to analyze key capabilities 
required to be able to counter the aggressor’s operations in such a complex environment. 
This appendix describes the main findings from the wargame.  
2. Scenario 
The Scenario is based on the defense of a free and democratic nation (BLUE) 
against a potent aggressor (RED). BLUE and RED share both a land and maritime 
border. Both countries are open economies with substantial natural resources. RED’s goal 
is to gain control over a limited geographical part of BLUE (the Area of Interest – AoI), 
or at least deny BLUE and BLUE’s defense alliance, GREEN’s, military usage of this 
area without triggering a war with GREEN. The ultimate purpose of this operation is to 
strengthen RED’s strategic defenses in case of a conflict with GREEN. 
3. General overview of the hybrid attack 
RED’s first aim is to get BLUE to accept a demilitarized zone in the AoI. RED 
intends to achieve this by generating a situation where BLUE fears it could lose control 
of the AoI and is willing to negotiate. RED’s strategy has three main elements: 
                                                 
8 We are grateful to Col (ret.) Jeffrey Appleget and his students LTC (GS) Christoph Hof, German 
Army, Major Frank Fiebiger, German Army, Major Bilal Sadiq Gondal, Pakistan Army and, Major Jens 
Peter Hubertus Ruether, German Army for their contributions in planning, executing and documenting the 
wargame. This appendix is an edited version of a memo written by the four NPS students. 
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• Establish partnerships and conduct military exercises with other countries, 
including GREEN, under disguise of a fabricated terrorist threat against RED 
- this will improve relations and prove the readiness and willingness of RED 
to act.  
• Launch a world-wide media campaign to convince the public opinion that 
RED is a good and reliable partner, a modern country which respects human 
rights and supports prosperity for all. Additionally, the goal is to drive a 
wedge into GREEN by portraying BLUE as a country aggressively violating 
RED’s rights.  
• Increase economic collaboration with the BLUE population and tilt the 
demographic balance in the Area of Interest (AoI) by settling RED migrants –
this will affect public opinion in AoI in RED’s favor.  
RED will launch a synchronized and coordinated whole of government campaign, 
supported by all its ministries and agencies, to influence and pressure BLUE while 
simultaneously distracting GREEN from action. The campaign is expected to last at least 
12 months, due to long preparation and execution time for subverting initiatives. These 
include i.a. negotiations to establish new economic collaborations (with friendly nations 
as well as members of GREEN), to move actors into the right positions and places 
(politicians, organizations, people), construct facilities (businesses, communications and 
power grids) and influence people world-wide. 
4. Preliminary measures to prepare the battlefield 
In the months before the attack, a large media campaign starts to portray RED as a 
staunch supporter of the United Nations, market economy, freedom rights and fight 
against international terrorism. Relations to partners are intensified and reassured, 
military exercises with partner nations are conducted.  
RED’s industry campaigns to get in closer touch with foreign companies, explore 
new markets and build new bilateral partnerships. RED’s industry secures long term 
contracts and increases its inventory to be prepared for a long conflict with BLUE and 
GREEN. Weak points of BLUE and GREEN are identified. 
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5. Main Courses of Action  
RED launches a media campaign to prepare the battlefield. Additionally, it starts a 
campaign to strengthen the ties to their allies and to gain new partners. This is to build a 
unified front against the alliance of GREEN. In a next step RED starts an economic 
campaign to weaken BLUE’s economic power, and prepare its own economy for a longer 
economic war. This is accompanied by an aggressive economic expansion to dispute 
BLUE’s resources and strengthen ties with BLUE’s population in the AoI through an 
“open border and free trade zone” initiative. All this aims to increase RED’s influence in 
the AoI.  
RED starts military exercises to prove its ability and willingness to defend itself, 
and also invites other countries, including GREEN, to anti-terror exercises. The aim is to 
gain further insight into GREEN’s and BLUE’s capabilities, alternatively to impeach 
them internationally if they do not join these exercises.  
RED drives a wedge into GREEN by approaching a couple of smaller members of 
GREEN to make them positive towards RED’s interests in the AoI in exchange for 
economic benefits. RED supports interior uprisings in BLUE and some smaller countries 
of GREEN (by religious groups, minorities and radical elements) to distract GREEN to 
focus on internal problems instead of RED’s conflict with BLUE.  
RED stages incidents and accidents with BLUE civilian and military equipment, 
which causes great negative impact on the environment and the BLUE population in the 
AoI. This is used to discredit BLUE internationally and create a sentiment in BLUE’s 
population that military activity should be moved from the AoI.  
Cyber-attacks on BLUE hamper and distract the communications and energy 
network massively, further discredits BLUE’s ability to handle problems and leads to loss 
of credibility both among BLUE’s population and in the world community. The whole 
campaign is supported by a massive media campaign discrediting BLUE’s policy and 
ability to handle all these problems, and praising RED’s efforts to assist the population of 
the AoI. 
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Through increased economic activity and migration, citizens of RED origin soon 
become the majority on a remote island in the AoI. Threatening to call a referendum on 
the separation of the island from BLUE, likely to be lost by BLUE, RED gets the upper 
hand in negotiations with BLUE. In exchange for a RED promise to call off the 
referendum, and thereby keeping control of the island, BLUE accepts a demilitarized 
zone in the whole of the AoI.  
6. Conclusion and main outcome of the hybrid attack  
After conducting a hybrid war campaign over a time span of a year, with 
preliminary measures of another half year in advance, RED was able to achieve a new 
treaty turning the whole AoI into a demilitarized zone. As such, RED reached its first 
goal. 
It is remarkable to note that not a single shot was fired by RED to reach the goal. 
The key to success for RED was to create a situation of multiple simultaneous threats and 
challenges for BLUE and GREEN, and then offer to ease these by a relatively modest 
demand. The demilitarization RED achieved may be seen by GREEN and the rest of the 
world as not very spectacular, but gave RED a huge strategic advantage in future conflict.  
The demilitarized zone secures freedom of movement for RED’s fleet and hampers the 
capabilities of BLUE and GREEN for early warning and countering of any RED troop 
movement into the AoI. 
The wargame indicates that hybrid attacks may be a potent way for an aggressor 
to conduct war. The use of traditional military means is not necessarily the most effective 
way to achieve the goal. Thoroughly preparation of the “battlefield”, a distinct time-
phased plan and integrated usage of all possible diplomatic, political, economic and 
military means may be the key to success.  
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APPENDIX B: ANTI-ACCESS / AREA DENIAL 
1. Introduction 
NORSOF should retain its capability to strike a high-tech opponent’s key 
installations in a high intensity scenario. This appendix will demonstrate how SOF can be 
used targeting an Anti-Air Missile Defense (AAMD) system in a hypothetical high-
intensity conflict with a high-tech opponent. The intention is to show a basic example of 
the use of innovative warfare by a task organized SOF in support of general purpose 
forces, as earlier discussed in the study. 
2. Scenario 
The overall purpose for BLUE forces is to degrade and delay the effectiveness of 
RED’s AAMD system in a specific geographical area, in order to set conditions for 
further air interdiction sorties targeting a military base. It is assessed that only SOF or 
SOF supported units can infiltrate the area of operation. SOF conduct operations with 
small and independent units using unconventional tactics and procedures, and may take 
greater risks (risk to force, risk to mission and risk to third party), than conventional 
units. A planning team has used the CARVER9 analysis methods to identify the AAMD 
system’s point of vulnerability for a strike.  
3. Mission Concept 
Multiple small teams (2-6 man/team) will be inserted, through a variety of 
infiltration methods, in the area where it is assessed that the vulnerable component of the 
AAMD system is operating. The size of the teams is determined by task, training level, 
experience of the operators, risk and infiltration method, as well as the capabilities 
needed. SOF will be using small and independent team equipped with sensors and long-
range high-caliber weapons as well as high-powered lasers. Also, cyber experts 
integrated in the teams equipped with computer generated trojans and viruses will be 
inserted in order to access radio link and/or radar systems for delaying the radar detection 
                                                 
9 CARVER stands for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperabilty, Vulnerability, Effect and 
Recognizability factors (Federation of American Science 2015). 
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and creating false targets for the AAMD system. Once the teams have been infiltrated, 
mini UAV swarms will be used in order to detect the radar system by initiating the target 
acquisition system. This will allow the ground teams to fix the radar systems in order to 
either use kinetic, laser or data means to degrade the AAMD system. The UAV swarms 
will also be equipped with trojan and viruses in order to ”overload” the system.  
Once the teams have acquired and effected a target, the overall air interdiction 
operation is triggered when the AAMD system is assessed to be less effective as 
indicated by damage assessment from the SOF teams as well as other intelligence 
sources. After the mission, several teams will continue to stay behind in order to report, 
conduct independent operations including direct action mission as well as unconventional 
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